The levels of analysis for your paper, using communities/liberal democracy as example:
Micro-level
Theoretical approaches to civil society, notions of citizenship [book: Civil Society]. Connection/relation of individual to the group.
Philosophy as a religion, belief system based on faith. Broader philosophy informs expectations at both levels. This will inform what you believe about liberal democracies and why you think it is (or isn’t) superior)
Mid-level
Example: citizenry in a liberal democracy (in the sense of valuing the individuals). Look at liberal democracy, start pulling out individual ideas. What’s the relationship between liberal democracies and how we in the US work? In terms of social institutions (e.g. government, market for ordering and setting framework of relationship between individuals and group). Three regulating entities in US liberal democracy—state/government, market/capitalism, civil society/community. Looking at the different philosophies of how these regulate, and how they regulate specifically to us. One obvious idea: individual as the unit of value. So our rules/regulations try to capture that.
EG: Bill of Rights and Constitution. (Side note: Some same concepts similar in all modern societies; difference may be in how they are instituted versus where you’re studying, in this case, the US. Think compared to the USSR, which also valued the individual in theory).
Micro-Level
Looking at the key practical questions when differentiating between modern societies.
Example of key terms/working definition: “Individual.” How is this conception embodied in the institutions?
Key ideas: Find normal standards, both ideal and in practice. Context is important (time period an important part context, as someone brought up the fact that the ideas of equality in the constitution were penned at a time when slavery was the norm)...
Constitution: open to interpretation. It specifies process, guilt-in standards about debate, discussion, making a collective decision of some kind.
How do you sharpen your focus?
Be able to move comfortably between narrow focus and abstract theoretical level. Start with your own clear definition of community=further from geographical boundary, think longer term sustainability. So, place and process important. Then think: what are the factors of success that make a difference. Rank these factors and variables as more or less important by your own or others’ standards. More key terms: Sustainability, capacity, resilience.
Ways to search for literature
Some terminology: community, community development, community organizing, social capital, community competence, empowerment. Keep in mind different aspects of these terms when reading literature.
EG: LR’s definition somewhat place-bound, also captures community-building, which is a particular process beyond simple growth. At macro view, what are you looking for? Involve people in decisions that affect their lives. So, some faith in ability of people to come together and solve their own problems. How is the capacity used for change and restructure?
Measuring success of community-building: impact on place, individual, process. So, moving in directions of practical questions…individuals: e.g. Resources, what do they feel, value, believe? Not always able to capture individuals’ talent to create collective community. [Discussion of Austin vs. Temple’s merits].
Allegiance and commitment—trust in the process, even if a given decision not consistent with what I want. Reciprocity—if that process works more likely to participate. Process dimension—what can you look at described as variables, speaking to this trust people place. Characteristics of community, community building process and of organizer/catalyst/activist—the person mindful of what’s necessary for the other two things to happen.
Things to think about in each of these three areas:
Community characteristics: Involves some conceptualization of what a health community looks like, “should” be. How or were where is the community? (Generally, and around a specific issue.) [Jefferson(?) insisted on an informed citizenry). Awareness, motivation. Is there a geographic dimension? Do people identify with the place, organization? Get sense of existing cohesion? If so, around what? Indication of existing capacity to adapt, respond? Assess whether there are already mechanisms in place for members to come together and discuss? Issue of leadership. Is there any? What is its nature? How did it emerge? Any track record in terms of solving problems? In part, LR’s same idea as building community.
Process of building community characteristics: Gauge degree of participation. Ideally, you want widespread participation, having the means (procedure-wise) to participate. Interactions between organizations, individuals in community, need good communications system in place. Faith in process, seeing value as individual in being part of the community. No use substituting other’s judgment for the common people (elite). People can decide without entire technical knowledge. Institutions allow people to come together to make important decisions (schools, universities, activist groups). Are there processes in place that allow leaders to emerge or to be identified? Are there things in community allowing to practice leading? E.g... Over-supervised children’s play not always helpful.
Activist’s characteristics: Do they understand the community? How decisions do or don’t get made? Can you determine the commitment of other catalysts? An element of trust between individual and community at large? Community builder experienced? How? How relevant? Are they eligible, adaptable, patient?
Remember the key areas at the micro levels, and the practical questions you would ask to assess them? In research, think more “what are my research questions” what are hypotheses? What are variables that capture the research questions? How can I asses/observe these variables?
Faith/believe vs. reason/logic (i.e. “Truth”) are they mutually exclusive? Some argue science only way. Or, possible common-sense, experience. Experienceàthis leads to “truth,” what work in the sense of keeping you moving. Keeping improving the human condition as that definition continues to evolve. Learning by doing vs. studying not mutually exclusive.
“Third Places”—gathering places; bowling alleys, bars, churches.
Next week: reading for summit; more on East Austin.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Monday, October 22, 2007
On the advantage of the WTO: If a big state negotiated with a small state, it wouldn’t be giving much up by walking away from the negotiations. If all the small states are working through the WTO, the big state would be walking away from all of them at once, in which case it has a lot more to lose. The large group of trade becomes self-sustaining because cost becomes much higher to defect/walk away, even for a hegemon.
This interest has nothing to do with altruism (fits in with neoliberal institutionalism). You set up the game this way. Self interested actors will cooperate and not compete rationally.
Trade and the Environment; interaction—International Political Economy
IR
International Security (war, alliances); not much at the second level of analysis (one example is the democratic peace)
International Political Economy (trade, environment); theories more often at the second level of analysis.
Note on the term “liberalism”—free trade, free economics (though in US, democratic more interested in protectionism, so it’s confusing).
Benefits of Free Trade (according to liberal theories)
Takes advantage of comparative advantage. Both countries do better by trading. “Autarky” is when there is no trade. Tariffs reduce the amount of trade, therefore the benefit of advantage.
By specializing, you might get even more efficient, with economies of scale. Free trade bad for monopolies by increasing competition. Domestic competitors might have barriers to entry, for instance, but international competitors may be well established.
Variety
Counterarguments (arguments FOR protectionism):
Why would you have normative protectionist strategy?
In the same way you should diversify a portfolio to reduce risk, specialization could be risky (eg. If that industry fails).
It might be hard to switch over people from one job to the specialty your country has the comparative advantage in. People don’t want to do that—a sector of society will oppose it. “Embedded liberalism”—you have to take care of the potential loser from trade or they will oppose it. Close to US domestic meaning of “liberal”). How can you protect the people who have to switch over? Slow down specialization, possibly by inhibiting free trade in the short term. The real-world idea that to promote free trade, you need some amount of protectionism.
Security/national defense. Certain things you don’t want to depend on others for (guns, oil, food). Eg. Japan protects its rice industry. This one particularly often wrongly cited because it’s hard to argue against.
Infant industries. Industries too “sensitive” (inefficient). But then they won’t give up their protection; you don’t want to give up your domestic monopoly. No incentive to become more efficient.
Balance of trade (Trade deficit)—tariffs could balance it out. Liberals would argue against tariffs as the tool. Your own currency depreciates, then your exports would go up, so trade would balance naturally.
If you have a comparative advantage in high-wage jobs, low-wage jobs go away, poor hurt; embedded liberalism says not to hurt the poor. Social safety net (welfare, job retraining, unemployment insurance) and protectionism.
What if Pareto-efficiency makes poor worse off? Liberal theories—more government revenue from the richer rich can redistribute the income. But rich won’t want to help. What about other countries’ poor? “Protectionism” refers to protection of your own country. Domestic redistribution (embedded liberalism) with global free trade the big win/win welfare maximization.
Spillover effects—liberal economics=no difference between potato chips and computer chips. But computer chips will give you extra spillover to other high-income/high-tech industries. Also, education levels if you specialize in high-tech will be higher, meaning more skills in various areas. If you need to protect a high-end industry to avoid specializing in low-tech, benefits in long-term outweigh short term costs.
(Krugman’s): strategic Trade Policy—the example of Boeing and Expressjet. Inefficiencies of a subsidy more than made up for by the capture of the rest of the market. Very rare.
Protectionism as a tactic or threat—if another country is doing it, we threaten retaliatory tariffs in order to get them to drop theirs. Game of chicken, with the potential for both to lose/fail, because in order to credible threaten, you may have to actually do it, then things spiral.
Capital Controls
Restriction of money flowing in and out of a country. Investment, usually, in stocks, companies. Country may want to have control over shocks in economy. Eg a 1929-esque spiral for an entire country. Shock/spiral might not happen so quickly if there are restrictions. Even if everyone had capital controls, there would still be foreign investment. Investors look for countries without capital controls. Country chooses between poverty and instability. Currently, countries removing capital controls. Represents, to some people, a diminution of autonomy of states. Cannot control own monetary policy. Not technically imperialism. Countries can set selves apart, like Albania. Or Chile can set up some capital controls—and they didn’t lose foreign investment, but retained control. Chile’s economy—investors willing to invest because it’s stable. Investors don’t think they’ll have to pull money out, so no worry that it would be more difficult to. Regaining this autonomy after gaining stability.
(aside 1997 Asian Financial Crisis: 80’s and 90’s saw a rapid deregulation of capital controls. “hot money” allowing quick removal, and 3 month loans, for example. Then, there was overproduction in Asia, and when that became apparent, people pulled their money out of the countries, accelerating the crash. In a single year, there were double digit losses in GDP. The mobile capital really exacerbated the problem of overproduction. Capital controls somewhat put back in.
The reduction of capital controls from the Western liberal idea of free trade. IMF probably worsened matters by recommending further liberalization, when Asian countries probably needed some level of protection at this point.)
Environment
Everything we read was partially international, but there are really two parts to differentiate between:
International effects on domestic environment (Eg acid rain between Canada and US)
Effects on international environment (Eg global warming)
“Race to the Bottom” comparative advantage can come from low environmental regulations (also, labor standards). So, countries have incentives to pollute, even with local problems results (lead poisoning example).
Local environmental standards—think classical liberalism, interconnectedness. There is no real isolated environment that won’t affect us. But good to differentiate between local and inherently global. Some thing that individual rationalism will not make the collective good. Law could fix the collective decision problem.
Excludable? (can you prevent someone from taking advantage of it?)
Rival? (depletable?)
Yes
No
Yes
Private good (eg pizza)
Common Pool Resource (“tragedy of the commons”; Eg Atmosphere in depletable sense; global fisheries)
No
Club Good/collective Good (once your are allowed membership in the country club, everyone can swim in the poll without depleting)
Public good (Eg swimming in the ocean)
A lot of focus on common pool resources because of tragedy of the commons, lose-lose prisoner’s dilemma.
Wijkman: Solutions—enclosing the commons, privatization. Classic collective action problem—could maybe come to an agreement with smaller compensation. Ideal international management (example with ocean fisheries auctioned, non-winners compensated).
This interest has nothing to do with altruism (fits in with neoliberal institutionalism). You set up the game this way. Self interested actors will cooperate and not compete rationally.
Trade and the Environment; interaction—International Political Economy
IR
International Security (war, alliances); not much at the second level of analysis (one example is the democratic peace)
International Political Economy (trade, environment); theories more often at the second level of analysis.
Note on the term “liberalism”—free trade, free economics (though in US, democratic more interested in protectionism, so it’s confusing).
Benefits of Free Trade (according to liberal theories)
Takes advantage of comparative advantage. Both countries do better by trading. “Autarky” is when there is no trade. Tariffs reduce the amount of trade, therefore the benefit of advantage.
By specializing, you might get even more efficient, with economies of scale. Free trade bad for monopolies by increasing competition. Domestic competitors might have barriers to entry, for instance, but international competitors may be well established.
Variety
Counterarguments (arguments FOR protectionism):
Why would you have normative protectionist strategy?
In the same way you should diversify a portfolio to reduce risk, specialization could be risky (eg. If that industry fails).
It might be hard to switch over people from one job to the specialty your country has the comparative advantage in. People don’t want to do that—a sector of society will oppose it. “Embedded liberalism”—you have to take care of the potential loser from trade or they will oppose it. Close to US domestic meaning of “liberal”). How can you protect the people who have to switch over? Slow down specialization, possibly by inhibiting free trade in the short term. The real-world idea that to promote free trade, you need some amount of protectionism.
Security/national defense. Certain things you don’t want to depend on others for (guns, oil, food). Eg. Japan protects its rice industry. This one particularly often wrongly cited because it’s hard to argue against.
Infant industries. Industries too “sensitive” (inefficient). But then they won’t give up their protection; you don’t want to give up your domestic monopoly. No incentive to become more efficient.
Balance of trade (Trade deficit)—tariffs could balance it out. Liberals would argue against tariffs as the tool. Your own currency depreciates, then your exports would go up, so trade would balance naturally.
If you have a comparative advantage in high-wage jobs, low-wage jobs go away, poor hurt; embedded liberalism says not to hurt the poor. Social safety net (welfare, job retraining, unemployment insurance) and protectionism.
What if Pareto-efficiency makes poor worse off? Liberal theories—more government revenue from the richer rich can redistribute the income. But rich won’t want to help. What about other countries’ poor? “Protectionism” refers to protection of your own country. Domestic redistribution (embedded liberalism) with global free trade the big win/win welfare maximization.
Spillover effects—liberal economics=no difference between potato chips and computer chips. But computer chips will give you extra spillover to other high-income/high-tech industries. Also, education levels if you specialize in high-tech will be higher, meaning more skills in various areas. If you need to protect a high-end industry to avoid specializing in low-tech, benefits in long-term outweigh short term costs.
(Krugman’s): strategic Trade Policy—the example of Boeing and Expressjet. Inefficiencies of a subsidy more than made up for by the capture of the rest of the market. Very rare.
Protectionism as a tactic or threat—if another country is doing it, we threaten retaliatory tariffs in order to get them to drop theirs. Game of chicken, with the potential for both to lose/fail, because in order to credible threaten, you may have to actually do it, then things spiral.
Capital Controls
Restriction of money flowing in and out of a country. Investment, usually, in stocks, companies. Country may want to have control over shocks in economy. Eg a 1929-esque spiral for an entire country. Shock/spiral might not happen so quickly if there are restrictions. Even if everyone had capital controls, there would still be foreign investment. Investors look for countries without capital controls. Country chooses between poverty and instability. Currently, countries removing capital controls. Represents, to some people, a diminution of autonomy of states. Cannot control own monetary policy. Not technically imperialism. Countries can set selves apart, like Albania. Or Chile can set up some capital controls—and they didn’t lose foreign investment, but retained control. Chile’s economy—investors willing to invest because it’s stable. Investors don’t think they’ll have to pull money out, so no worry that it would be more difficult to. Regaining this autonomy after gaining stability.
(aside 1997 Asian Financial Crisis: 80’s and 90’s saw a rapid deregulation of capital controls. “hot money” allowing quick removal, and 3 month loans, for example. Then, there was overproduction in Asia, and when that became apparent, people pulled their money out of the countries, accelerating the crash. In a single year, there were double digit losses in GDP. The mobile capital really exacerbated the problem of overproduction. Capital controls somewhat put back in.
The reduction of capital controls from the Western liberal idea of free trade. IMF probably worsened matters by recommending further liberalization, when Asian countries probably needed some level of protection at this point.)
Environment
Everything we read was partially international, but there are really two parts to differentiate between:
International effects on domestic environment (Eg acid rain between Canada and US)
Effects on international environment (Eg global warming)
“Race to the Bottom” comparative advantage can come from low environmental regulations (also, labor standards). So, countries have incentives to pollute, even with local problems results (lead poisoning example).
Local environmental standards—think classical liberalism, interconnectedness. There is no real isolated environment that won’t affect us. But good to differentiate between local and inherently global. Some thing that individual rationalism will not make the collective good. Law could fix the collective decision problem.
Excludable? (can you prevent someone from taking advantage of it?)
Rival? (depletable?)
Yes
No
Yes
Private good (eg pizza)
Common Pool Resource (“tragedy of the commons”; Eg Atmosphere in depletable sense; global fisheries)
No
Club Good/collective Good (once your are allowed membership in the country club, everyone can swim in the poll without depleting)
Public good (Eg swimming in the ocean)
A lot of focus on common pool resources because of tragedy of the commons, lose-lose prisoner’s dilemma.
Wijkman: Solutions—enclosing the commons, privatization. Classic collective action problem—could maybe come to an agreement with smaller compensation. Ideal international management (example with ocean fisheries auctioned, non-winners compensated).
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
little to big to little again
(oh, and I forgot the link that got me thinking on the below topic, Costa Rica's referendum on the free trade agreement with the US. For better or worse, the topic was at least discussed and understood by the population it affected before it passed.)
In class last week, Professor Rhodes talked about the often-underestimated capabilities of a community to understand for itself the decisions it can make. We had been talking about Al Gore's Inconvenient Truth presentation and its value in taking the argument to "the people," who will be just as affected (in this case, by climate change) as those making the decision. I brought up the fact that maybe Al Gore wasn't bringing the full scientific understanding to the people, but he was at least summarizing the work that had been done. I'm trying to find the best way to put what I'm trying to add on to what we talked about in class, but it has to do with the balance between trust in the system and contribution to the system.
In class, when I brought up the fact that Al Gore's presentation is a simplification of the process that at least gets people to trust that the experts really aren't trying to pull one over, Professor Rhodes gave the qualified agreement, but emphasized that people do have more capabilities of understanding than usually credited with. I have been thinking about things that cloud this understanding. And I think a large part of it is distrust in the system (in this case, I would be thinking of the country at large), and this leads to a lack of motiviation and engagement in the decision-making process (another concept emphasized in class).
My thinking is colored by the other classes I'm taking, and this week in International Policy we went over some aspects of Game Theory, about why and when people priorotize their individual goals over the common goals, even if the overall payoff for the common goals is greater. (This is in some ways the crux of why I am interested in public policy). Two of the "solutions" to the Prisoner's Dilemma (in getting the "rational individual"'s decision that's best for him personally to coincide with the one that's best for the group) is to make the group that's making the decision smaller, and to make it known the group will make similar decisions in the future. Therefore, I think of the ideas of community that we are getting at are similar to the solution to the social problem--a finite group whose members all have some connection to each other, and foresee making decisions together in the future.
With fewer decisions being made at the local level, people have less of a reason to form a community that will attempt to understand the problems that are going to affect them. With less reason and motivation to understand problems of varying effect on the individuals, there will more more of an assumption that people aren't capable or willing to understand their problems. Which in turn is going to lead to politicians and extra-community leaders making decisions that will affect them.
OK, this is a little pessimistic, but it's a sort of overarching vicious circle that I can see as a problem in our country being so huge.
I wonder what sense of personal responsibility the children at the Edible Schoolyard will be gleaning from their experience. Will they be more likely to feel empowered when they see the connections they have to the world around them? Or will a small bastien of control in New Orleans seem artificial to them as they grow up and start experiencing the crushing frustrations of most adults trying their best to make a change to the city they love?
In class last week, Professor Rhodes talked about the often-underestimated capabilities of a community to understand for itself the decisions it can make. We had been talking about Al Gore's Inconvenient Truth presentation and its value in taking the argument to "the people," who will be just as affected (in this case, by climate change) as those making the decision. I brought up the fact that maybe Al Gore wasn't bringing the full scientific understanding to the people, but he was at least summarizing the work that had been done. I'm trying to find the best way to put what I'm trying to add on to what we talked about in class, but it has to do with the balance between trust in the system and contribution to the system.
In class, when I brought up the fact that Al Gore's presentation is a simplification of the process that at least gets people to trust that the experts really aren't trying to pull one over, Professor Rhodes gave the qualified agreement, but emphasized that people do have more capabilities of understanding than usually credited with. I have been thinking about things that cloud this understanding. And I think a large part of it is distrust in the system (in this case, I would be thinking of the country at large), and this leads to a lack of motiviation and engagement in the decision-making process (another concept emphasized in class).
My thinking is colored by the other classes I'm taking, and this week in International Policy we went over some aspects of Game Theory, about why and when people priorotize their individual goals over the common goals, even if the overall payoff for the common goals is greater. (This is in some ways the crux of why I am interested in public policy). Two of the "solutions" to the Prisoner's Dilemma (in getting the "rational individual"'s decision that's best for him personally to coincide with the one that's best for the group) is to make the group that's making the decision smaller, and to make it known the group will make similar decisions in the future. Therefore, I think of the ideas of community that we are getting at are similar to the solution to the social problem--a finite group whose members all have some connection to each other, and foresee making decisions together in the future.
With fewer decisions being made at the local level, people have less of a reason to form a community that will attempt to understand the problems that are going to affect them. With less reason and motivation to understand problems of varying effect on the individuals, there will more more of an assumption that people aren't capable or willing to understand their problems. Which in turn is going to lead to politicians and extra-community leaders making decisions that will affect them.
OK, this is a little pessimistic, but it's a sort of overarching vicious circle that I can see as a problem in our country being so huge.
I wonder what sense of personal responsibility the children at the Edible Schoolyard will be gleaning from their experience. Will they be more likely to feel empowered when they see the connections they have to the world around them? Or will a small bastien of control in New Orleans seem artificial to them as they grow up and start experiencing the crushing frustrations of most adults trying their best to make a change to the city they love?
Monday, October 8, 2007
Explanation of the term “neoconservative”: US foreign policy debate on how to treat the USSR. Three positions:
1. Rollback—existence of Soviets on the planet were a danger by existing because they would expand/infect world, destroy our freedom. Partly realist. Also worry about the idea “catching on”—liberal notion of “why should you care about people far away.” So partly classical liberalism (we are all connected).
2. Containment—military and political flavor. Quarantine the threat. Do not cooperate. Idea that since our system is better, the communists will eventually collapse.
3. Détente—We don’t have to contain it—that would make the world more dangerous. So we should interact, trade, exchange.
Détente—democratic and Kissinger and Nixon parties associated. “We can live with communism forever.” Other countries freedom doesn’t matter. Very realist, the democrats came around to it in the 70’s.
But there was a backlash—helping was viewed as morally outrageous. Senator Jackson said they need to take a harder line. Became “neoconservative”—deal with USSR because of internal workings, not foreign policy. Not neorealist. Idea of regime changes came around.
(Interdependence continued)
What is the explanation for weak states pushing around strong states (oil crisis again)? Sensitivity (can be though of as short-term). Why was US sensitive, but not vulnerable? Other supply sources of energy. And changes to demand (fuel efficiency). If we’d been vulnerable, war more likely. What is their (K and N) version of interdependence? They add “complex interdependence”—we have many more ties between people than just business to business (“globalization”). The interconnected NGO’s, easier travel, nonstate actors. So, even more things would be lost as a result of war. Recent events suggest this is not the reason for not invading during embargo (2 wars since in Middle East). True that we give up a lot of the inter-dependence, but that still didn’t stop us.
Complex interdependence=the web of [??] matters (think Freedom Fries).
Liberalism—obstacles to collective action
Olson—Do groups act in their own self-interest? Do gropus of rational individuals act in the group’s self-interest?
Public good—everyone benefits.
Collective good—members of the group benefit.
People more likely to free-ride—all of the benefit and none of the cost. This is why we have underprovision of public goods. We are net worse off.
Only a few ways to get it done:
Coercion: “Hegemon” can punish. Forces individual self-interest (eg labor union requires picketing, or you’d lost your job). Hegemonic coercion. Collective action problem (League of Nations).
Hegemonic leadership—a single actor benefits enough to do it rationally (in the mining road example, the mine company itself benefits enough to make the road). Charging the freeriders would be a form of coercion (ie a toll on the road for the miners). Hegemonic coercion sometimes a form of hegemonic leadership. Taxation an example of coercion.
Small group can overcome the problem of freeriding. No anonymity. Only transparency. This facilitates cooperation. “K-group” where K is a small number. This insight from observations of cartels. Smaller=easier. True for all.
So, do we see as little cooperation as predicted? Keep in mind some non-financial benefits can make an action rational even if it seems pure altruistic. Or ethics may drive to “irrational” decision. Enlisting in army and voting are examples. Patriotism is an ethos that makes you act irrationally. These examples are pervasive. Is this true for states? Consider later, when we get to “norms.” For the rest of today we’re going to assume states act on rational self-interest.
Neoliberalism (Neoliberal institutionalism)
Non-normative. (classical assumes no different between individual and common(?).
Even if states selfish and not altruistic, cooperation possible between states. Beating realists at own game (starting with same assumptions, but different potential outcome). Set up so mutual benefit from selfishness.
Axelrod—Prisoner’s Dilemma an depend on how likely to repeat interaction in the future. If played over and over, then the payoffs change. So cost of defecting is now also the likelihood of other side defecting in future. Try to get it so if you cooperate, it’s better for me to cooperate. “tit for tat” won the competition/simulation. You cooperate last time, I cooperate this time. Same for defection. Evolution of the cooperators surviving.
Relative Gains vs. Absolute Gains
If both countries get absolute gains in a trade deal, but country B gets a relative gain, will country A support the deal? Realists say no. Neoliberals say yes.
Country A
Country B
GDP
5
5
GDP (with trade)
7
8
Normative only in that structures that would promote this should be constructed. Anyway, what will state A actually do in the above situation? When will a state not care about relative gains?
No switch in dominance (but may think about it more carefully if dominance lessened against certain states)
Is the other state a rival? I.e. If A/B is US/UK vs. US/USSR
Idea of a “friend” vs. “rival.” Walt, remember, said there are other factors besides power. Balance of Power Vs. Balance of Threat (determined by aggressive intentions). By Waltz prescription, it’s better to be poorer as there’s no relative loss, even if a friend. We should suffer, so they suffer more. Not a popular idea, so democrats and republicans both favor open trade.
Order of countries preferences
Cooperate
Defect
Cooperate
2
2
1
4
Defect
4
1
3
3
Countries acting rationally, in their own self-interest, end up in Box 4 (both defecting)
Oye— Getting from box 4à1. Olson’s idea of having a small group of people. Detecting defection is easier—Defection is less attractive. Or Axelrod’s prescription—repeat iterations (“lengthening the shadow of the future”) so tit-for-tat can become a prescription and rational decision. Alter the payoffs (directly, not just shadow of the future). One idea is the one of “hostages,” making it so you and others suffer more if you defect. Put your own troops in harm’s way (similar to First Move Advantage scenario.). Publicize a treaty. Everyone knows if you break it, no one trusts you, not just the person you broke it with (Wilson’s idea). How do you lengthen the shadow of the future? Don’t fling open doors—becomes a one-shot game if they stab you in the back. Peace negotiations, slow etc. Start seeing several rounds of them, each one becomes more and more likely. How an you increase your ability to discern what is defection (worst misperception is they cooperate but you think they are defecting).
Transparency and “norms” help with misperception.
Set a norm—if the norm/agreement is 100 missiles per year, 100 is cooperation. If only 50/yr, 100 is defection. Norms needed to clarify cooperation and defection.
Reduce number of players. Better to have local trade agreements rather than, for example, the WTO. Total gains vs. individual gains again. How do you split up the total gains?
An individual may gain more from something that benefits less overall. All of these things can be done by institutions. Building, norms, rules for example.
Keohane most famous for explaining why institutions can do this increase in cooperation.
§ They provide information, which creates transparency. Eg. International Atomic Energy Agency.
§ Reduction of transaction costs. Cooperation more costly if you need lawyers, negotiations; cumbersome. Institutions can reduce those costs. Economies of scale.
§ They lengthen the shadow of the future. If you screw over someone, you might have to face them the next day (at the UN, for example, on a different issue the next day). That’s why there are very few vetoes in the UN).
§ Institutions can also provide for enforcement. Punishment if a country defects. Possibly less likely to use violent means. Institutions have smaller numbers, more likely to carry out enforcement as it’s a collective good.
1. Rollback—existence of Soviets on the planet were a danger by existing because they would expand/infect world, destroy our freedom. Partly realist. Also worry about the idea “catching on”—liberal notion of “why should you care about people far away.” So partly classical liberalism (we are all connected).
2. Containment—military and political flavor. Quarantine the threat. Do not cooperate. Idea that since our system is better, the communists will eventually collapse.
3. Détente—We don’t have to contain it—that would make the world more dangerous. So we should interact, trade, exchange.
Détente—democratic and Kissinger and Nixon parties associated. “We can live with communism forever.” Other countries freedom doesn’t matter. Very realist, the democrats came around to it in the 70’s.
But there was a backlash—helping was viewed as morally outrageous. Senator Jackson said they need to take a harder line. Became “neoconservative”—deal with USSR because of internal workings, not foreign policy. Not neorealist. Idea of regime changes came around.
(Interdependence continued)
What is the explanation for weak states pushing around strong states (oil crisis again)? Sensitivity (can be though of as short-term). Why was US sensitive, but not vulnerable? Other supply sources of energy. And changes to demand (fuel efficiency). If we’d been vulnerable, war more likely. What is their (K and N) version of interdependence? They add “complex interdependence”—we have many more ties between people than just business to business (“globalization”). The interconnected NGO’s, easier travel, nonstate actors. So, even more things would be lost as a result of war. Recent events suggest this is not the reason for not invading during embargo (2 wars since in Middle East). True that we give up a lot of the inter-dependence, but that still didn’t stop us.
Complex interdependence=the web of [??] matters (think Freedom Fries).
Liberalism—obstacles to collective action
Olson—Do groups act in their own self-interest? Do gropus of rational individuals act in the group’s self-interest?
Public good—everyone benefits.
Collective good—members of the group benefit.
People more likely to free-ride—all of the benefit and none of the cost. This is why we have underprovision of public goods. We are net worse off.
Only a few ways to get it done:
Coercion: “Hegemon” can punish. Forces individual self-interest (eg labor union requires picketing, or you’d lost your job). Hegemonic coercion. Collective action problem (League of Nations).
Hegemonic leadership—a single actor benefits enough to do it rationally (in the mining road example, the mine company itself benefits enough to make the road). Charging the freeriders would be a form of coercion (ie a toll on the road for the miners). Hegemonic coercion sometimes a form of hegemonic leadership. Taxation an example of coercion.
Small group can overcome the problem of freeriding. No anonymity. Only transparency. This facilitates cooperation. “K-group” where K is a small number. This insight from observations of cartels. Smaller=easier. True for all.
So, do we see as little cooperation as predicted? Keep in mind some non-financial benefits can make an action rational even if it seems pure altruistic. Or ethics may drive to “irrational” decision. Enlisting in army and voting are examples. Patriotism is an ethos that makes you act irrationally. These examples are pervasive. Is this true for states? Consider later, when we get to “norms.” For the rest of today we’re going to assume states act on rational self-interest.
Neoliberalism (Neoliberal institutionalism)
Non-normative. (classical assumes no different between individual and common(?).
Even if states selfish and not altruistic, cooperation possible between states. Beating realists at own game (starting with same assumptions, but different potential outcome). Set up so mutual benefit from selfishness.
Axelrod—Prisoner’s Dilemma an depend on how likely to repeat interaction in the future. If played over and over, then the payoffs change. So cost of defecting is now also the likelihood of other side defecting in future. Try to get it so if you cooperate, it’s better for me to cooperate. “tit for tat” won the competition/simulation. You cooperate last time, I cooperate this time. Same for defection. Evolution of the cooperators surviving.
Relative Gains vs. Absolute Gains
If both countries get absolute gains in a trade deal, but country B gets a relative gain, will country A support the deal? Realists say no. Neoliberals say yes.
Country A
Country B
GDP
5
5
GDP (with trade)
7
8
Normative only in that structures that would promote this should be constructed. Anyway, what will state A actually do in the above situation? When will a state not care about relative gains?
No switch in dominance (but may think about it more carefully if dominance lessened against certain states)
Is the other state a rival? I.e. If A/B is US/UK vs. US/USSR
Idea of a “friend” vs. “rival.” Walt, remember, said there are other factors besides power. Balance of Power Vs. Balance of Threat (determined by aggressive intentions). By Waltz prescription, it’s better to be poorer as there’s no relative loss, even if a friend. We should suffer, so they suffer more. Not a popular idea, so democrats and republicans both favor open trade.
Order of countries preferences
Cooperate
Defect
Cooperate
2
2
1
4
Defect
4
1
3
3
Countries acting rationally, in their own self-interest, end up in Box 4 (both defecting)
Oye— Getting from box 4à1. Olson’s idea of having a small group of people. Detecting defection is easier—Defection is less attractive. Or Axelrod’s prescription—repeat iterations (“lengthening the shadow of the future”) so tit-for-tat can become a prescription and rational decision. Alter the payoffs (directly, not just shadow of the future). One idea is the one of “hostages,” making it so you and others suffer more if you defect. Put your own troops in harm’s way (similar to First Move Advantage scenario.). Publicize a treaty. Everyone knows if you break it, no one trusts you, not just the person you broke it with (Wilson’s idea). How do you lengthen the shadow of the future? Don’t fling open doors—becomes a one-shot game if they stab you in the back. Peace negotiations, slow etc. Start seeing several rounds of them, each one becomes more and more likely. How an you increase your ability to discern what is defection (worst misperception is they cooperate but you think they are defecting).
Transparency and “norms” help with misperception.
Set a norm—if the norm/agreement is 100 missiles per year, 100 is cooperation. If only 50/yr, 100 is defection. Norms needed to clarify cooperation and defection.
Reduce number of players. Better to have local trade agreements rather than, for example, the WTO. Total gains vs. individual gains again. How do you split up the total gains?
An individual may gain more from something that benefits less overall. All of these things can be done by institutions. Building, norms, rules for example.
Keohane most famous for explaining why institutions can do this increase in cooperation.
§ They provide information, which creates transparency. Eg. International Atomic Energy Agency.
§ Reduction of transaction costs. Cooperation more costly if you need lawyers, negotiations; cumbersome. Institutions can reduce those costs. Economies of scale.
§ They lengthen the shadow of the future. If you screw over someone, you might have to face them the next day (at the UN, for example, on a different issue the next day). That’s why there are very few vetoes in the UN).
§ Institutions can also provide for enforcement. Punishment if a country defects. Possibly less likely to use violent means. Institutions have smaller numbers, more likely to carry out enforcement as it’s a collective good.
Monday, October 1, 2007
Preventive war vs. preemptive war
Preventive War: if something might arise at some point in the future because of changing power levels (power=army, nuclear weapons). For instance, A looks at B, sees the trajectory, attacks to prevent [graph in notes]. But also makes sure war is either inevitable or highly likely, or else you will be starting a war that wouldn’t have happened. Reactions different depending on how you view country B (friend or foe). Also, if A’s trajectory going down, A might start the war to steal B’s steady but low wealth/power, or to completely destroy them to ensure you they never are above you in the power structure.
Preemptive War: the threat is NOW. And it’s to your advantage to attack first. “First move advantage.” And you think the other side might attack you. So high likelihood of attack imminently vs. attack down the road. The greater the First Mover Advantage is, the more likely preemptive war. Shelling: “The mutual fear of surprise attack.” To stabilize a situation, try to eliminate the First Mover Advantage. Possibilities—have weapons on each side that could survive First Strike (harden silos; stipulate one warhead per missile).
Nuclear weapons—more nukes, less war (Waltz). Benefit to attacker is reduced. Attacking with nukes becomes suicide, but conventional attack also faces risk of nuke counter. Assumes rational decision makers—why not concerned with maverick leaders? There would be some rational people along the chain of command, and even crazy people have to realize the complete gravity of nuclear war. You don’t have to be perfectly rational to recognize how huge an impact it will have.
Problems:
§ nonstate actors having access to nuclear weapons (difficulty: no clear “return address,” so mutually assured destruction out; some don’t have the same survival requirement—people sacrifice themselves and fellows in the name of a cause).
§ Nuclear inheritance: state with civil war, or little command and control, nukes could no longer belong to rational states.
§ B getting nukes means B has gotten much more power, approaching another more powerful state [graph in notes]. When you first develop them, you are very susceptible to First Strike Advantage from the state whose power you might overtake or approach. International opinion/disapproval has proved not a significant deterrent.
But, interesting point one which the article written: US vs. USSRà no nuke wars, no conventional wars. Prior to nukes, 2 major wars. Then only proxy wars.
Iran with nukes would have its own Munroe Doctrine—its own authority in the Middle East, and Us doesn’t want that.
Realismàfrom snapshots to dynamism.
Power and rising power. Is D’s rise to power [graph included in notes of A, B, C at steady powers, D on trajectory to overtake all].
Gilpin: What does the great power do? Ultimately maybe a choice of fighting to stay on top, or acquiescing. But states rarely jump to one of these extreme options. Try to slow the rise of State D. Eg: Constraining them economically. Or increase own power (eg technological innovation), limiting foreign policy commitments—instinct of state as they grow leads to imperial overstretch—realization that imperialism not so beneficial. So retrenching important. What does it mean to acquiesce in this situation. What did Britain give US (with Munroe Doctrine)? Influence—material benefits, yes. What else to rising powers want that others already have? Benefits of treaties, trade, other benefits to status (besides just prestige, glory) (think of 5 UN veto states=5 nuke/powerful states). If a country has power but not prestige, country could get frustrated at this imbalance—it could become belligerent. So, should big power grant membership?
What should you do? Depends on who they are—how aligned are you interests/how do you define them (status quo, revolutionary. Control vs. Values). Why did UK acquiesce to US when the UK still had significant power? No disagreement on most areas of IR. UK saw US running half the world, and it didn’t really upset the fundamentals of the international order that existing powers had set up (borders etc). But someone preferring for example an exclusive economic zone might be worth fighting.
US vs. China policy:
Bush I’s grand strategy post Cold War in 1990’s (article reading). Implicitly—knock down any rising power, convince other countries they don’t need to grow in military power to protect their interests. So, what convinces them? We offer to protect them. US provides global security. People would have no need to even think of challenging us—so we can knock them down if they get uppity. This plan could not be implemented till Bush II—Cheney/Wolfowitz came up with it while in charge, then Clinton elected. Then, BushII: Iraq was knocked down. Libya convinced not to challenge. For a while, seemed successful.
So what are we going to do regarding China? Several examples of how we are appeasing China given in class. We don’t seem to be doing any convincing/quashing. Why “no” tension between Bush and China? Best guess is 9-11—switch to seeing China as ally on War on Terror—we saw a greater threat to bandwagon against.
Liberalism
Realism focuses on conflict—zero sum competition.
Liberalism focuses on cooperation—positive-sum outcomes.
Positive sum gains from cooperation only achieved by giving up some amount of state autonomy. Liberals argue it is worth the trade. So liberalism is also a normative theory. More normative than realism. Think realism and balance of power as a law, not a strategy.
Variants of liberalism:
Classical liberalism: “utopian liberalism.” Humans will improve over time. Become more rational. Realize there are better ways of doing things than in the past. Leads to cooperation, no warfare.
Based on economic interdependence: Benefits from economic cooperation and trade that are lost when people are fighting. So costs of warfare go up by including the losses incurred.
Democratic Peace Theory: liberal democratic states don’t go to war against each other.
Neoliberal institutionalism: “Neoliberalism.” Specific term in IR field, but does have other meanings in other fields.
Classical liberalism
Eg: Locke, Crousse, Sully
Locke—“natural law.” Right and wrong exist, and are waiting to be discovered. So, progress possible as man discovers these law.
Crousse—suggestion of League of Princes, like UN. Recommended Turkey have a seat before a Christian state. Not based on civilization. Has come to pass in UN. Trade important. Economic interdependence something always part of classical liberalism.
The goal of elimination war. Use of force illegal in most liberal theory. Defense OK, but not the first punch.
Arms control and disarmament—have only enough for defense but not attack. Increase in weapons leads to increase in war.
Locke’s state of nature. Rationality prevents violence.
Abolish imperialism—illegal to conquer. No changing borders by force. Borders sacrosanct, no state may disappear. Whenever this happened before, theory argues, it was before we understood why it was bad.
Kant: states not monarch’s property. If anything, joint property of people. Normative: people should be who are in control of the states. It is right because it’s the people who pay the costs (eg. Going to war). Of the people by the people, for the people etc.
Means for reducing the prospect of war. Everyone wants this. Why does Kant believe he has found the achievable utopia/ What is mechanism for perpetual peace? Republicanism=liberal democracy (he is anti-“democracy” of his time; democracy mean despotism. Do people in this democracy support the leader? The people subject to manipulation, populism, fascism. Not necessarily good—Hitler had support of people. Unmediated connection between people and leader is bad. So notion of republicanism, division between executive and legislative, represented by people. This mediation seen as something to prevent fascism, dictators, despotism. So important to properly specify “liberal democratic peace.”). So, Kant says with these republics, we get perpetual peace. Decision for war in hands of people, people don’t want wars because they pay the price. Why wouldn’t a despot be just as averse to potentially losing a war? Despot does not see tangible costs of war. See potential territory, gold, but costs not as apparent than if you’re a peasant. “The glory of its ruler [despot] consists in his power to order thousands of his people to immolate themselves [for his “sport”].” Not enough to have just republics. Also need institutions of controls. Idea of serious/phony treaties. Getting rid of the “bad” treaties.
Wilson: Public treaty can be made insincere by secret treaties that violate. States can’t be annexed if everyone agrees not to recognize your gains. Makes it not worth fighting, even winning.
Kant: Forcing republican state elsewhere not part of the game plan. States don’t interfere with internal conflict. What will we interfere with in another states? Nothing. We only regulate the external affairs of states (stop aggression, false treaties). State A won’t even interfere with state B’s having an army. And it’s true in international law now, this is illegal.
On what basis are these states constituted? What is basis of state for classical liberals? Original idea: freeze states as-are (Kant—no states may grow, shrink or disappear. Conquest is over). But as we got more normative info, recognition deserved by all people self-determination.
When is a people a people? Ethno-national self-determination. War caused by people’s desire for this self-determination. As long as one group rules another, you have “casus belli”. No complaints of imperialism. Hard to define a group. Hard to draw a border even if you can define them. That is why further evolution over the last few decades saying Wilson’s idea is crazy. Now liberal ideal is multi-ethnic states. Monoethnic states are considered classical liberalism. Now separating ethnicities for peace considered realist (even if they want to get along they can’t get along. The Security Dilemma eliminated by eliminating ethnic mingling).
Interdependence
With trade, both countries better off. Stop trade, both worse off. War generally interrupts trade. More you trade, more you have to lose; the less likely war. More trade=less war.
Angell (1910)—argues there is no benefit for invaders anymore. But times badly since WWI happened 4 years later. Before that, no war since Napoleon (1815). So this theory lost credibility. A long time before people started these arguments again (Keohane and Nye in the 1970’s attempted to rehabilitate). Myth of “new” globalization. One measure is % trade over GDP. [chart in notes shows graph of this over time—we are only just now again re-approaching the amount of trade we had just before WWI]. So purely economic independence did not save Europe.
Do Keohane and Nye say the same thing? Motivated by the oil crisis of the 1970’s. Oil embargo from PEC after Yom Kippur war. Tiny states of Middle East imposing a huge problem. Why didn’t US just crush them? Historically “realistically” odd. Sensitivity vs. vulnerability. [Think about liberal arguments that war will become less likely]. Think about whether this theory is persuasive to you.
Preventive War: if something might arise at some point in the future because of changing power levels (power=army, nuclear weapons). For instance, A looks at B, sees the trajectory, attacks to prevent [graph in notes]. But also makes sure war is either inevitable or highly likely, or else you will be starting a war that wouldn’t have happened. Reactions different depending on how you view country B (friend or foe). Also, if A’s trajectory going down, A might start the war to steal B’s steady but low wealth/power, or to completely destroy them to ensure you they never are above you in the power structure.
Preemptive War: the threat is NOW. And it’s to your advantage to attack first. “First move advantage.” And you think the other side might attack you. So high likelihood of attack imminently vs. attack down the road. The greater the First Mover Advantage is, the more likely preemptive war. Shelling: “The mutual fear of surprise attack.” To stabilize a situation, try to eliminate the First Mover Advantage. Possibilities—have weapons on each side that could survive First Strike (harden silos; stipulate one warhead per missile).
Nuclear weapons—more nukes, less war (Waltz). Benefit to attacker is reduced. Attacking with nukes becomes suicide, but conventional attack also faces risk of nuke counter. Assumes rational decision makers—why not concerned with maverick leaders? There would be some rational people along the chain of command, and even crazy people have to realize the complete gravity of nuclear war. You don’t have to be perfectly rational to recognize how huge an impact it will have.
Problems:
§ nonstate actors having access to nuclear weapons (difficulty: no clear “return address,” so mutually assured destruction out; some don’t have the same survival requirement—people sacrifice themselves and fellows in the name of a cause).
§ Nuclear inheritance: state with civil war, or little command and control, nukes could no longer belong to rational states.
§ B getting nukes means B has gotten much more power, approaching another more powerful state [graph in notes]. When you first develop them, you are very susceptible to First Strike Advantage from the state whose power you might overtake or approach. International opinion/disapproval has proved not a significant deterrent.
But, interesting point one which the article written: US vs. USSRà no nuke wars, no conventional wars. Prior to nukes, 2 major wars. Then only proxy wars.
Iran with nukes would have its own Munroe Doctrine—its own authority in the Middle East, and Us doesn’t want that.
Realismàfrom snapshots to dynamism.
Power and rising power. Is D’s rise to power [graph included in notes of A, B, C at steady powers, D on trajectory to overtake all].
Gilpin: What does the great power do? Ultimately maybe a choice of fighting to stay on top, or acquiescing. But states rarely jump to one of these extreme options. Try to slow the rise of State D. Eg: Constraining them economically. Or increase own power (eg technological innovation), limiting foreign policy commitments—instinct of state as they grow leads to imperial overstretch—realization that imperialism not so beneficial. So retrenching important. What does it mean to acquiesce in this situation. What did Britain give US (with Munroe Doctrine)? Influence—material benefits, yes. What else to rising powers want that others already have? Benefits of treaties, trade, other benefits to status (besides just prestige, glory) (think of 5 UN veto states=5 nuke/powerful states). If a country has power but not prestige, country could get frustrated at this imbalance—it could become belligerent. So, should big power grant membership?
What should you do? Depends on who they are—how aligned are you interests/how do you define them (status quo, revolutionary. Control vs. Values). Why did UK acquiesce to US when the UK still had significant power? No disagreement on most areas of IR. UK saw US running half the world, and it didn’t really upset the fundamentals of the international order that existing powers had set up (borders etc). But someone preferring for example an exclusive economic zone might be worth fighting.
US vs. China policy:
Bush I’s grand strategy post Cold War in 1990’s (article reading). Implicitly—knock down any rising power, convince other countries they don’t need to grow in military power to protect their interests. So, what convinces them? We offer to protect them. US provides global security. People would have no need to even think of challenging us—so we can knock them down if they get uppity. This plan could not be implemented till Bush II—Cheney/Wolfowitz came up with it while in charge, then Clinton elected. Then, BushII: Iraq was knocked down. Libya convinced not to challenge. For a while, seemed successful.
So what are we going to do regarding China? Several examples of how we are appeasing China given in class. We don’t seem to be doing any convincing/quashing. Why “no” tension between Bush and China? Best guess is 9-11—switch to seeing China as ally on War on Terror—we saw a greater threat to bandwagon against.
Liberalism
Realism focuses on conflict—zero sum competition.
Liberalism focuses on cooperation—positive-sum outcomes.
Positive sum gains from cooperation only achieved by giving up some amount of state autonomy. Liberals argue it is worth the trade. So liberalism is also a normative theory. More normative than realism. Think realism and balance of power as a law, not a strategy.
Variants of liberalism:
Classical liberalism: “utopian liberalism.” Humans will improve over time. Become more rational. Realize there are better ways of doing things than in the past. Leads to cooperation, no warfare.
Based on economic interdependence: Benefits from economic cooperation and trade that are lost when people are fighting. So costs of warfare go up by including the losses incurred.
Democratic Peace Theory: liberal democratic states don’t go to war against each other.
Neoliberal institutionalism: “Neoliberalism.” Specific term in IR field, but does have other meanings in other fields.
Classical liberalism
Eg: Locke, Crousse, Sully
Locke—“natural law.” Right and wrong exist, and are waiting to be discovered. So, progress possible as man discovers these law.
Crousse—suggestion of League of Princes, like UN. Recommended Turkey have a seat before a Christian state. Not based on civilization. Has come to pass in UN. Trade important. Economic interdependence something always part of classical liberalism.
The goal of elimination war. Use of force illegal in most liberal theory. Defense OK, but not the first punch.
Arms control and disarmament—have only enough for defense but not attack. Increase in weapons leads to increase in war.
Locke’s state of nature. Rationality prevents violence.
Abolish imperialism—illegal to conquer. No changing borders by force. Borders sacrosanct, no state may disappear. Whenever this happened before, theory argues, it was before we understood why it was bad.
Kant: states not monarch’s property. If anything, joint property of people. Normative: people should be who are in control of the states. It is right because it’s the people who pay the costs (eg. Going to war). Of the people by the people, for the people etc.
Means for reducing the prospect of war. Everyone wants this. Why does Kant believe he has found the achievable utopia/ What is mechanism for perpetual peace? Republicanism=liberal democracy (he is anti-“democracy” of his time; democracy mean despotism. Do people in this democracy support the leader? The people subject to manipulation, populism, fascism. Not necessarily good—Hitler had support of people. Unmediated connection between people and leader is bad. So notion of republicanism, division between executive and legislative, represented by people. This mediation seen as something to prevent fascism, dictators, despotism. So important to properly specify “liberal democratic peace.”). So, Kant says with these republics, we get perpetual peace. Decision for war in hands of people, people don’t want wars because they pay the price. Why wouldn’t a despot be just as averse to potentially losing a war? Despot does not see tangible costs of war. See potential territory, gold, but costs not as apparent than if you’re a peasant. “The glory of its ruler [despot] consists in his power to order thousands of his people to immolate themselves [for his “sport”].” Not enough to have just republics. Also need institutions of controls. Idea of serious/phony treaties. Getting rid of the “bad” treaties.
Wilson: Public treaty can be made insincere by secret treaties that violate. States can’t be annexed if everyone agrees not to recognize your gains. Makes it not worth fighting, even winning.
Kant: Forcing republican state elsewhere not part of the game plan. States don’t interfere with internal conflict. What will we interfere with in another states? Nothing. We only regulate the external affairs of states (stop aggression, false treaties). State A won’t even interfere with state B’s having an army. And it’s true in international law now, this is illegal.
On what basis are these states constituted? What is basis of state for classical liberals? Original idea: freeze states as-are (Kant—no states may grow, shrink or disappear. Conquest is over). But as we got more normative info, recognition deserved by all people self-determination.
When is a people a people? Ethno-national self-determination. War caused by people’s desire for this self-determination. As long as one group rules another, you have “casus belli”. No complaints of imperialism. Hard to define a group. Hard to draw a border even if you can define them. That is why further evolution over the last few decades saying Wilson’s idea is crazy. Now liberal ideal is multi-ethnic states. Monoethnic states are considered classical liberalism. Now separating ethnicities for peace considered realist (even if they want to get along they can’t get along. The Security Dilemma eliminated by eliminating ethnic mingling).
Interdependence
With trade, both countries better off. Stop trade, both worse off. War generally interrupts trade. More you trade, more you have to lose; the less likely war. More trade=less war.
Angell (1910)—argues there is no benefit for invaders anymore. But times badly since WWI happened 4 years later. Before that, no war since Napoleon (1815). So this theory lost credibility. A long time before people started these arguments again (Keohane and Nye in the 1970’s attempted to rehabilitate). Myth of “new” globalization. One measure is % trade over GDP. [chart in notes shows graph of this over time—we are only just now again re-approaching the amount of trade we had just before WWI]. So purely economic independence did not save Europe.
Do Keohane and Nye say the same thing? Motivated by the oil crisis of the 1970’s. Oil embargo from PEC after Yom Kippur war. Tiny states of Middle East imposing a huge problem. Why didn’t US just crush them? Historically “realistically” odd. Sensitivity vs. vulnerability. [Think about liberal arguments that war will become less likely]. Think about whether this theory is persuasive to you.
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