Preventive war vs. preemptive war
Preventive War: if something might arise at some point in the future because of changing power levels (power=army, nuclear weapons). For instance, A looks at B, sees the trajectory, attacks to prevent [graph in notes]. But also makes sure war is either inevitable or highly likely, or else you will be starting a war that wouldn’t have happened. Reactions different depending on how you view country B (friend or foe). Also, if A’s trajectory going down, A might start the war to steal B’s steady but low wealth/power, or to completely destroy them to ensure you they never are above you in the power structure.
Preemptive War: the threat is NOW. And it’s to your advantage to attack first. “First move advantage.” And you think the other side might attack you. So high likelihood of attack imminently vs. attack down the road. The greater the First Mover Advantage is, the more likely preemptive war. Shelling: “The mutual fear of surprise attack.” To stabilize a situation, try to eliminate the First Mover Advantage. Possibilities—have weapons on each side that could survive First Strike (harden silos; stipulate one warhead per missile).

Nuclear weapons—more nukes, less war (Waltz). Benefit to attacker is reduced. Attacking with nukes becomes suicide, but conventional attack also faces risk of nuke counter. Assumes rational decision makers—why not concerned with maverick leaders? There would be some rational people along the chain of command, and even crazy people have to realize the complete gravity of nuclear war. You don’t have to be perfectly rational to recognize how huge an impact it will have.
Problems:
§ nonstate actors having access to nuclear weapons (difficulty: no clear “return address,” so mutually assured destruction out; some don’t have the same survival requirement—people sacrifice themselves and fellows in the name of a cause).
§ Nuclear inheritance: state with civil war, or little command and control, nukes could no longer belong to rational states.
§ B getting nukes means B has gotten much more power, approaching another more powerful state [graph in notes]. When you first develop them, you are very susceptible to First Strike Advantage from the state whose power you might overtake or approach. International opinion/disapproval has proved not a significant deterrent.
But, interesting point one which the article written: US vs. USSRà no nuke wars, no conventional wars. Prior to nukes, 2 major wars. Then only proxy wars.
Iran with nukes would have its own Munroe Doctrine—its own authority in the Middle East, and Us doesn’t want that.

Realismàfrom snapshots to dynamism.
Power and rising power. Is D’s rise to power [graph included in notes of A, B, C at steady powers, D on trajectory to overtake all].

Gilpin: What does the great power do? Ultimately maybe a choice of fighting to stay on top, or acquiescing. But states rarely jump to one of these extreme options. Try to slow the rise of State D. Eg: Constraining them economically. Or increase own power (eg technological innovation), limiting foreign policy commitments—instinct of state as they grow leads to imperial overstretch—realization that imperialism not so beneficial. So retrenching important. What does it mean to acquiesce in this situation. What did Britain give US (with Munroe Doctrine)? Influence—material benefits, yes. What else to rising powers want that others already have? Benefits of treaties, trade, other benefits to status (besides just prestige, glory) (think of 5 UN veto states=5 nuke/powerful states). If a country has power but not prestige, country could get frustrated at this imbalance—it could become belligerent. So, should big power grant membership?
What should you do? Depends on who they are—how aligned are you interests/how do you define them (status quo, revolutionary. Control vs. Values). Why did UK acquiesce to US when the UK still had significant power? No disagreement on most areas of IR. UK saw US running half the world, and it didn’t really upset the fundamentals of the international order that existing powers had set up (borders etc). But someone preferring for example an exclusive economic zone might be worth fighting.

US vs. China policy:
Bush I’s grand strategy post Cold War in 1990’s (article reading). Implicitly—knock down any rising power, convince other countries they don’t need to grow in military power to protect their interests. So, what convinces them? We offer to protect them. US provides global security. People would have no need to even think of challenging us—so we can knock them down if they get uppity. This plan could not be implemented till Bush II—Cheney/Wolfowitz came up with it while in charge, then Clinton elected. Then, BushII: Iraq was knocked down. Libya convinced not to challenge. For a while, seemed successful.
So what are we going to do regarding China? Several examples of how we are appeasing China given in class. We don’t seem to be doing any convincing/quashing. Why “no” tension between Bush and China? Best guess is 9-11—switch to seeing China as ally on War on Terror—we saw a greater threat to bandwagon against.

Liberalism
Realism focuses on conflict—zero sum competition.
Liberalism focuses on cooperation—positive-sum outcomes.

Positive sum gains from cooperation only achieved by giving up some amount of state autonomy. Liberals argue it is worth the trade. So liberalism is also a normative theory. More normative than realism. Think realism and balance of power as a law, not a strategy.

Variants of liberalism:
Classical liberalism: “utopian liberalism.” Humans will improve over time. Become more rational. Realize there are better ways of doing things than in the past. Leads to cooperation, no warfare.
Based on economic interdependence: Benefits from economic cooperation and trade that are lost when people are fighting. So costs of warfare go up by including the losses incurred.
Democratic Peace Theory: liberal democratic states don’t go to war against each other.
Neoliberal institutionalism: “Neoliberalism.” Specific term in IR field, but does have other meanings in other fields.

Classical liberalism
Eg: Locke, Crousse, Sully
Locke—“natural law.” Right and wrong exist, and are waiting to be discovered. So, progress possible as man discovers these law.
Crousse—suggestion of League of Princes, like UN. Recommended Turkey have a seat before a Christian state. Not based on civilization. Has come to pass in UN. Trade important. Economic interdependence something always part of classical liberalism.

The goal of elimination war. Use of force illegal in most liberal theory. Defense OK, but not the first punch.

Arms control and disarmament—have only enough for defense but not attack. Increase in weapons leads to increase in war.

Locke’s state of nature. Rationality prevents violence.

Abolish imperialism—illegal to conquer. No changing borders by force. Borders sacrosanct, no state may disappear. Whenever this happened before, theory argues, it was before we understood why it was bad.

Kant: states not monarch’s property. If anything, joint property of people. Normative: people should be who are in control of the states. It is right because it’s the people who pay the costs (eg. Going to war). Of the people by the people, for the people etc.
Means for reducing the prospect of war. Everyone wants this. Why does Kant believe he has found the achievable utopia/ What is mechanism for perpetual peace? Republicanism=liberal democracy (he is anti-“democracy” of his time; democracy mean despotism. Do people in this democracy support the leader? The people subject to manipulation, populism, fascism. Not necessarily good—Hitler had support of people. Unmediated connection between people and leader is bad. So notion of republicanism, division between executive and legislative, represented by people. This mediation seen as something to prevent fascism, dictators, despotism. So important to properly specify “liberal democratic peace.”). So, Kant says with these republics, we get perpetual peace. Decision for war in hands of people, people don’t want wars because they pay the price. Why wouldn’t a despot be just as averse to potentially losing a war? Despot does not see tangible costs of war. See potential territory, gold, but costs not as apparent than if you’re a peasant. “The glory of its ruler [despot] consists in his power to order thousands of his people to immolate themselves [for his “sport”].” Not enough to have just republics. Also need institutions of controls. Idea of serious/phony treaties. Getting rid of the “bad” treaties.
Wilson: Public treaty can be made insincere by secret treaties that violate. States can’t be annexed if everyone agrees not to recognize your gains. Makes it not worth fighting, even winning.
Kant: Forcing republican state elsewhere not part of the game plan. States don’t interfere with internal conflict. What will we interfere with in another states? Nothing. We only regulate the external affairs of states (stop aggression, false treaties). State A won’t even interfere with state B’s having an army. And it’s true in international law now, this is illegal.

On what basis are these states constituted? What is basis of state for classical liberals? Original idea: freeze states as-are (Kant—no states may grow, shrink or disappear. Conquest is over). But as we got more normative info, recognition deserved by all people self-determination.
When is a people a people? Ethno-national self-determination. War caused by people’s desire for this self-determination. As long as one group rules another, you have “casus belli”. No complaints of imperialism. Hard to define a group. Hard to draw a border even if you can define them. That is why further evolution over the last few decades saying Wilson’s idea is crazy. Now liberal ideal is multi-ethnic states. Monoethnic states are considered classical liberalism. Now separating ethnicities for peace considered realist (even if they want to get along they can’t get along. The Security Dilemma eliminated by eliminating ethnic mingling).


Interdependence
With trade, both countries better off. Stop trade, both worse off. War generally interrupts trade. More you trade, more you have to lose; the less likely war. More trade=less war.
Angell (1910)—argues there is no benefit for invaders anymore. But times badly since WWI happened 4 years later. Before that, no war since Napoleon (1815). So this theory lost credibility. A long time before people started these arguments again (Keohane and Nye in the 1970’s attempted to rehabilitate). Myth of “new” globalization. One measure is % trade over GDP. [chart in notes shows graph of this over time—we are only just now again re-approaching the amount of trade we had just before WWI]. So purely economic independence did not save Europe.
Do Keohane and Nye say the same thing? Motivated by the oil crisis of the 1970’s. Oil embargo from PEC after Yom Kippur war. Tiny states of Middle East imposing a huge problem. Why didn’t US just crush them? Historically “realistically” odd. Sensitivity vs. vulnerability. [Think about liberal arguments that war will become less likely]. Think about whether this theory is persuasive to you.