On the advantage of the WTO: If a big state negotiated with a small state, it wouldn’t be giving much up by walking away from the negotiations. If all the small states are working through the WTO, the big state would be walking away from all of them at once, in which case it has a lot more to lose. The large group of trade becomes self-sustaining because cost becomes much higher to defect/walk away, even for a hegemon.
This interest has nothing to do with altruism (fits in with neoliberal institutionalism). You set up the game this way. Self interested actors will cooperate and not compete rationally.


Trade and the Environment; interaction—International Political Economy
IR
International Security (war, alliances); not much at the second level of analysis (one example is the democratic peace)
International Political Economy (trade, environment); theories more often at the second level of analysis.

Note on the term “liberalism”—free trade, free economics (though in US, democratic more interested in protectionism, so it’s confusing).

Benefits of Free Trade (according to liberal theories)
Takes advantage of comparative advantage. Both countries do better by trading. “Autarky” is when there is no trade. Tariffs reduce the amount of trade, therefore the benefit of advantage.
By specializing, you might get even more efficient, with economies of scale. Free trade bad for monopolies by increasing competition. Domestic competitors might have barriers to entry, for instance, but international competitors may be well established.
Variety

Counterarguments (arguments FOR protectionism):
Why would you have normative protectionist strategy?
In the same way you should diversify a portfolio to reduce risk, specialization could be risky (eg. If that industry fails).
It might be hard to switch over people from one job to the specialty your country has the comparative advantage in. People don’t want to do that—a sector of society will oppose it. “Embedded liberalism”—you have to take care of the potential loser from trade or they will oppose it. Close to US domestic meaning of “liberal”). How can you protect the people who have to switch over? Slow down specialization, possibly by inhibiting free trade in the short term. The real-world idea that to promote free trade, you need some amount of protectionism.
Security/national defense. Certain things you don’t want to depend on others for (guns, oil, food). Eg. Japan protects its rice industry. This one particularly often wrongly cited because it’s hard to argue against.
Infant industries. Industries too “sensitive” (inefficient). But then they won’t give up their protection; you don’t want to give up your domestic monopoly. No incentive to become more efficient.
Balance of trade (Trade deficit)—tariffs could balance it out. Liberals would argue against tariffs as the tool. Your own currency depreciates, then your exports would go up, so trade would balance naturally.
If you have a comparative advantage in high-wage jobs, low-wage jobs go away, poor hurt; embedded liberalism says not to hurt the poor. Social safety net (welfare, job retraining, unemployment insurance) and protectionism.
What if Pareto-efficiency makes poor worse off? Liberal theories—more government revenue from the richer rich can redistribute the income. But rich won’t want to help. What about other countries’ poor? “Protectionism” refers to protection of your own country. Domestic redistribution (embedded liberalism) with global free trade the big win/win welfare maximization.
Spillover effects—liberal economics=no difference between potato chips and computer chips. But computer chips will give you extra spillover to other high-income/high-tech industries. Also, education levels if you specialize in high-tech will be higher, meaning more skills in various areas. If you need to protect a high-end industry to avoid specializing in low-tech, benefits in long-term outweigh short term costs.
(Krugman’s): strategic Trade Policy—the example of Boeing and Expressjet. Inefficiencies of a subsidy more than made up for by the capture of the rest of the market. Very rare.
Protectionism as a tactic or threat—if another country is doing it, we threaten retaliatory tariffs in order to get them to drop theirs. Game of chicken, with the potential for both to lose/fail, because in order to credible threaten, you may have to actually do it, then things spiral.

Capital Controls
Restriction of money flowing in and out of a country. Investment, usually, in stocks, companies. Country may want to have control over shocks in economy. Eg a 1929-esque spiral for an entire country. Shock/spiral might not happen so quickly if there are restrictions. Even if everyone had capital controls, there would still be foreign investment. Investors look for countries without capital controls. Country chooses between poverty and instability. Currently, countries removing capital controls. Represents, to some people, a diminution of autonomy of states. Cannot control own monetary policy. Not technically imperialism. Countries can set selves apart, like Albania. Or Chile can set up some capital controls—and they didn’t lose foreign investment, but retained control. Chile’s economy—investors willing to invest because it’s stable. Investors don’t think they’ll have to pull money out, so no worry that it would be more difficult to. Regaining this autonomy after gaining stability.

(aside 1997 Asian Financial Crisis: 80’s and 90’s saw a rapid deregulation of capital controls. “hot money” allowing quick removal, and 3 month loans, for example. Then, there was overproduction in Asia, and when that became apparent, people pulled their money out of the countries, accelerating the crash. In a single year, there were double digit losses in GDP. The mobile capital really exacerbated the problem of overproduction. Capital controls somewhat put back in.
The reduction of capital controls from the Western liberal idea of free trade. IMF probably worsened matters by recommending further liberalization, when Asian countries probably needed some level of protection at this point.)

Environment
Everything we read was partially international, but there are really two parts to differentiate between:
International effects on domestic environment (Eg acid rain between Canada and US)
Effects on international environment (Eg global warming)

“Race to the Bottom” comparative advantage can come from low environmental regulations (also, labor standards). So, countries have incentives to pollute, even with local problems results (lead poisoning example).

Local environmental standards—think classical liberalism, interconnectedness. There is no real isolated environment that won’t affect us. But good to differentiate between local and inherently global. Some thing that individual rationalism will not make the collective good. Law could fix the collective decision problem.



Excludable? (can you prevent someone from taking advantage of it?)
Rival? (depletable?)

Yes
No
Yes
Private good (eg pizza)
Common Pool Resource (“tragedy of the commons”; Eg Atmosphere in depletable sense; global fisheries)
No
Club Good/collective Good (once your are allowed membership in the country club, everyone can swim in the poll without depleting)
Public good (Eg swimming in the ocean)
A lot of focus on common pool resources because of tragedy of the commons, lose-lose prisoner’s dilemma.

Wijkman: Solutions—enclosing the commons, privatization. Classic collective action problem—could maybe come to an agreement with smaller compensation. Ideal international management (example with ocean fisheries auctioned, non-winners compensated).

Explanation of the term “neoconservative”: US foreign policy debate on how to treat the USSR. Three positions:
1. Rollback—existence of Soviets on the planet were a danger by existing because they would expand/infect world, destroy our freedom. Partly realist. Also worry about the idea “catching on”—liberal notion of “why should you care about people far away.” So partly classical liberalism (we are all connected).
2. Containment—military and political flavor. Quarantine the threat. Do not cooperate. Idea that since our system is better, the communists will eventually collapse.
3. Détente—We don’t have to contain it—that would make the world more dangerous. So we should interact, trade, exchange.
Détente—democratic and Kissinger and Nixon parties associated. “We can live with communism forever.” Other countries freedom doesn’t matter. Very realist, the democrats came around to it in the 70’s.
But there was a backlash—helping was viewed as morally outrageous. Senator Jackson said they need to take a harder line. Became “neoconservative”—deal with USSR because of internal workings, not foreign policy. Not neorealist. Idea of regime changes came around.

(Interdependence continued)
What is the explanation for weak states pushing around strong states (oil crisis again)? Sensitivity (can be though of as short-term). Why was US sensitive, but not vulnerable? Other supply sources of energy. And changes to demand (fuel efficiency). If we’d been vulnerable, war more likely. What is their (K and N) version of interdependence? They add “complex interdependence”—we have many more ties between people than just business to business (“globalization”). The interconnected NGO’s, easier travel, nonstate actors. So, even more things would be lost as a result of war. Recent events suggest this is not the reason for not invading during embargo (2 wars since in Middle East). True that we give up a lot of the inter-dependence, but that still didn’t stop us.
Complex interdependence=the web of [??] matters (think Freedom Fries).

Liberalism—obstacles to collective action
Olson—Do groups act in their own self-interest? Do gropus of rational individuals act in the group’s self-interest?
Public good—everyone benefits.
Collective good—members of the group benefit.
People more likely to free-ride—all of the benefit and none of the cost. This is why we have underprovision of public goods. We are net worse off.
Only a few ways to get it done:
Coercion: “Hegemon” can punish. Forces individual self-interest (eg labor union requires picketing, or you’d lost your job). Hegemonic coercion. Collective action problem (League of Nations).
Hegemonic leadership—a single actor benefits enough to do it rationally (in the mining road example, the mine company itself benefits enough to make the road). Charging the freeriders would be a form of coercion (ie a toll on the road for the miners). Hegemonic coercion sometimes a form of hegemonic leadership. Taxation an example of coercion.
Small group can overcome the problem of freeriding. No anonymity. Only transparency. This facilitates cooperation. “K-group” where K is a small number. This insight from observations of cartels. Smaller=easier. True for all.
So, do we see as little cooperation as predicted? Keep in mind some non-financial benefits can make an action rational even if it seems pure altruistic. Or ethics may drive to “irrational” decision. Enlisting in army and voting are examples. Patriotism is an ethos that makes you act irrationally. These examples are pervasive. Is this true for states? Consider later, when we get to “norms.” For the rest of today we’re going to assume states act on rational self-interest.

Neoliberalism (Neoliberal institutionalism)
Non-normative. (classical assumes no different between individual and common(?).

Even if states selfish and not altruistic, cooperation possible between states. Beating realists at own game (starting with same assumptions, but different potential outcome). Set up so mutual benefit from selfishness.

Axelrod—Prisoner’s Dilemma an depend on how likely to repeat interaction in the future. If played over and over, then the payoffs change. So cost of defecting is now also the likelihood of other side defecting in future. Try to get it so if you cooperate, it’s better for me to cooperate. “tit for tat” won the competition/simulation. You cooperate last time, I cooperate this time. Same for defection. Evolution of the cooperators surviving.

Relative Gains vs. Absolute Gains
If both countries get absolute gains in a trade deal, but country B gets a relative gain, will country A support the deal? Realists say no. Neoliberals say yes.

Country A
Country B
GDP
5
5
GDP (with trade)
7
8
Normative only in that structures that would promote this should be constructed. Anyway, what will state A actually do in the above situation? When will a state not care about relative gains?
No switch in dominance (but may think about it more carefully if dominance lessened against certain states)
Is the other state a rival? I.e. If A/B is US/UK vs. US/USSR
Idea of a “friend” vs. “rival.” Walt, remember, said there are other factors besides power. Balance of Power Vs. Balance of Threat (determined by aggressive intentions). By Waltz prescription, it’s better to be poorer as there’s no relative loss, even if a friend. We should suffer, so they suffer more. Not a popular idea, so democrats and republicans both favor open trade.

Order of countries preferences

Cooperate
Defect
Cooperate
2
2
1
4
Defect
4
1
3
3
Countries acting rationally, in their own self-interest, end up in Box 4 (both defecting)

Oye— Getting from box 4à1. Olson’s idea of having a small group of people. Detecting defection is easier—Defection is less attractive. Or Axelrod’s prescription—repeat iterations (“lengthening the shadow of the future”) so tit-for-tat can become a prescription and rational decision. Alter the payoffs (directly, not just shadow of the future). One idea is the one of “hostages,” making it so you and others suffer more if you defect. Put your own troops in harm’s way (similar to First Move Advantage scenario.). Publicize a treaty. Everyone knows if you break it, no one trusts you, not just the person you broke it with (Wilson’s idea). How do you lengthen the shadow of the future? Don’t fling open doors—becomes a one-shot game if they stab you in the back. Peace negotiations, slow etc. Start seeing several rounds of them, each one becomes more and more likely. How an you increase your ability to discern what is defection (worst misperception is they cooperate but you think they are defecting).
Transparency and “norms” help with misperception.
Set a norm—if the norm/agreement is 100 missiles per year, 100 is cooperation. If only 50/yr, 100 is defection. Norms needed to clarify cooperation and defection.
Reduce number of players. Better to have local trade agreements rather than, for example, the WTO. Total gains vs. individual gains again. How do you split up the total gains?
An individual may gain more from something that benefits less overall. All of these things can be done by institutions. Building, norms, rules for example.

Keohane most famous for explaining why institutions can do this increase in cooperation.
§ They provide information, which creates transparency. Eg. International Atomic Energy Agency.
§ Reduction of transaction costs. Cooperation more costly if you need lawyers, negotiations; cumbersome. Institutions can reduce those costs. Economies of scale.
§ They lengthen the shadow of the future. If you screw over someone, you might have to face them the next day (at the UN, for example, on a different issue the next day). That’s why there are very few vetoes in the UN).
§ Institutions can also provide for enforcement. Punishment if a country defects. Possibly less likely to use violent means. Institutions have smaller numbers, more likely to carry out enforcement as it’s a collective good.

Preventive war vs. preemptive war
Preventive War: if something might arise at some point in the future because of changing power levels (power=army, nuclear weapons). For instance, A looks at B, sees the trajectory, attacks to prevent [graph in notes]. But also makes sure war is either inevitable or highly likely, or else you will be starting a war that wouldn’t have happened. Reactions different depending on how you view country B (friend or foe). Also, if A’s trajectory going down, A might start the war to steal B’s steady but low wealth/power, or to completely destroy them to ensure you they never are above you in the power structure.
Preemptive War: the threat is NOW. And it’s to your advantage to attack first. “First move advantage.” And you think the other side might attack you. So high likelihood of attack imminently vs. attack down the road. The greater the First Mover Advantage is, the more likely preemptive war. Shelling: “The mutual fear of surprise attack.” To stabilize a situation, try to eliminate the First Mover Advantage. Possibilities—have weapons on each side that could survive First Strike (harden silos; stipulate one warhead per missile).

Nuclear weapons—more nukes, less war (Waltz). Benefit to attacker is reduced. Attacking with nukes becomes suicide, but conventional attack also faces risk of nuke counter. Assumes rational decision makers—why not concerned with maverick leaders? There would be some rational people along the chain of command, and even crazy people have to realize the complete gravity of nuclear war. You don’t have to be perfectly rational to recognize how huge an impact it will have.
Problems:
§ nonstate actors having access to nuclear weapons (difficulty: no clear “return address,” so mutually assured destruction out; some don’t have the same survival requirement—people sacrifice themselves and fellows in the name of a cause).
§ Nuclear inheritance: state with civil war, or little command and control, nukes could no longer belong to rational states.
§ B getting nukes means B has gotten much more power, approaching another more powerful state [graph in notes]. When you first develop them, you are very susceptible to First Strike Advantage from the state whose power you might overtake or approach. International opinion/disapproval has proved not a significant deterrent.
But, interesting point one which the article written: US vs. USSRà no nuke wars, no conventional wars. Prior to nukes, 2 major wars. Then only proxy wars.
Iran with nukes would have its own Munroe Doctrine—its own authority in the Middle East, and Us doesn’t want that.

Realismàfrom snapshots to dynamism.
Power and rising power. Is D’s rise to power [graph included in notes of A, B, C at steady powers, D on trajectory to overtake all].

Gilpin: What does the great power do? Ultimately maybe a choice of fighting to stay on top, or acquiescing. But states rarely jump to one of these extreme options. Try to slow the rise of State D. Eg: Constraining them economically. Or increase own power (eg technological innovation), limiting foreign policy commitments—instinct of state as they grow leads to imperial overstretch—realization that imperialism not so beneficial. So retrenching important. What does it mean to acquiesce in this situation. What did Britain give US (with Munroe Doctrine)? Influence—material benefits, yes. What else to rising powers want that others already have? Benefits of treaties, trade, other benefits to status (besides just prestige, glory) (think of 5 UN veto states=5 nuke/powerful states). If a country has power but not prestige, country could get frustrated at this imbalance—it could become belligerent. So, should big power grant membership?
What should you do? Depends on who they are—how aligned are you interests/how do you define them (status quo, revolutionary. Control vs. Values). Why did UK acquiesce to US when the UK still had significant power? No disagreement on most areas of IR. UK saw US running half the world, and it didn’t really upset the fundamentals of the international order that existing powers had set up (borders etc). But someone preferring for example an exclusive economic zone might be worth fighting.

US vs. China policy:
Bush I’s grand strategy post Cold War in 1990’s (article reading). Implicitly—knock down any rising power, convince other countries they don’t need to grow in military power to protect their interests. So, what convinces them? We offer to protect them. US provides global security. People would have no need to even think of challenging us—so we can knock them down if they get uppity. This plan could not be implemented till Bush II—Cheney/Wolfowitz came up with it while in charge, then Clinton elected. Then, BushII: Iraq was knocked down. Libya convinced not to challenge. For a while, seemed successful.
So what are we going to do regarding China? Several examples of how we are appeasing China given in class. We don’t seem to be doing any convincing/quashing. Why “no” tension between Bush and China? Best guess is 9-11—switch to seeing China as ally on War on Terror—we saw a greater threat to bandwagon against.

Liberalism
Realism focuses on conflict—zero sum competition.
Liberalism focuses on cooperation—positive-sum outcomes.

Positive sum gains from cooperation only achieved by giving up some amount of state autonomy. Liberals argue it is worth the trade. So liberalism is also a normative theory. More normative than realism. Think realism and balance of power as a law, not a strategy.

Variants of liberalism:
Classical liberalism: “utopian liberalism.” Humans will improve over time. Become more rational. Realize there are better ways of doing things than in the past. Leads to cooperation, no warfare.
Based on economic interdependence: Benefits from economic cooperation and trade that are lost when people are fighting. So costs of warfare go up by including the losses incurred.
Democratic Peace Theory: liberal democratic states don’t go to war against each other.
Neoliberal institutionalism: “Neoliberalism.” Specific term in IR field, but does have other meanings in other fields.

Classical liberalism
Eg: Locke, Crousse, Sully
Locke—“natural law.” Right and wrong exist, and are waiting to be discovered. So, progress possible as man discovers these law.
Crousse—suggestion of League of Princes, like UN. Recommended Turkey have a seat before a Christian state. Not based on civilization. Has come to pass in UN. Trade important. Economic interdependence something always part of classical liberalism.

The goal of elimination war. Use of force illegal in most liberal theory. Defense OK, but not the first punch.

Arms control and disarmament—have only enough for defense but not attack. Increase in weapons leads to increase in war.

Locke’s state of nature. Rationality prevents violence.

Abolish imperialism—illegal to conquer. No changing borders by force. Borders sacrosanct, no state may disappear. Whenever this happened before, theory argues, it was before we understood why it was bad.

Kant: states not monarch’s property. If anything, joint property of people. Normative: people should be who are in control of the states. It is right because it’s the people who pay the costs (eg. Going to war). Of the people by the people, for the people etc.
Means for reducing the prospect of war. Everyone wants this. Why does Kant believe he has found the achievable utopia/ What is mechanism for perpetual peace? Republicanism=liberal democracy (he is anti-“democracy” of his time; democracy mean despotism. Do people in this democracy support the leader? The people subject to manipulation, populism, fascism. Not necessarily good—Hitler had support of people. Unmediated connection between people and leader is bad. So notion of republicanism, division between executive and legislative, represented by people. This mediation seen as something to prevent fascism, dictators, despotism. So important to properly specify “liberal democratic peace.”). So, Kant says with these republics, we get perpetual peace. Decision for war in hands of people, people don’t want wars because they pay the price. Why wouldn’t a despot be just as averse to potentially losing a war? Despot does not see tangible costs of war. See potential territory, gold, but costs not as apparent than if you’re a peasant. “The glory of its ruler [despot] consists in his power to order thousands of his people to immolate themselves [for his “sport”].” Not enough to have just republics. Also need institutions of controls. Idea of serious/phony treaties. Getting rid of the “bad” treaties.
Wilson: Public treaty can be made insincere by secret treaties that violate. States can’t be annexed if everyone agrees not to recognize your gains. Makes it not worth fighting, even winning.
Kant: Forcing republican state elsewhere not part of the game plan. States don’t interfere with internal conflict. What will we interfere with in another states? Nothing. We only regulate the external affairs of states (stop aggression, false treaties). State A won’t even interfere with state B’s having an army. And it’s true in international law now, this is illegal.

On what basis are these states constituted? What is basis of state for classical liberals? Original idea: freeze states as-are (Kant—no states may grow, shrink or disappear. Conquest is over). But as we got more normative info, recognition deserved by all people self-determination.
When is a people a people? Ethno-national self-determination. War caused by people’s desire for this self-determination. As long as one group rules another, you have “casus belli”. No complaints of imperialism. Hard to define a group. Hard to draw a border even if you can define them. That is why further evolution over the last few decades saying Wilson’s idea is crazy. Now liberal ideal is multi-ethnic states. Monoethnic states are considered classical liberalism. Now separating ethnicities for peace considered realist (even if they want to get along they can’t get along. The Security Dilemma eliminated by eliminating ethnic mingling).


Interdependence
With trade, both countries better off. Stop trade, both worse off. War generally interrupts trade. More you trade, more you have to lose; the less likely war. More trade=less war.
Angell (1910)—argues there is no benefit for invaders anymore. But times badly since WWI happened 4 years later. Before that, no war since Napoleon (1815). So this theory lost credibility. A long time before people started these arguments again (Keohane and Nye in the 1970’s attempted to rehabilitate). Myth of “new” globalization. One measure is % trade over GDP. [chart in notes shows graph of this over time—we are only just now again re-approaching the amount of trade we had just before WWI]. So purely economic independence did not save Europe.
Do Keohane and Nye say the same thing? Motivated by the oil crisis of the 1970’s. Oil embargo from PEC after Yom Kippur war. Tiny states of Middle East imposing a huge problem. Why didn’t US just crush them? Historically “realistically” odd. Sensitivity vs. vulnerability. [Think about liberal arguments that war will become less likely]. Think about whether this theory is persuasive to you.

Susan Strange; Global Change and Theoretical Challenges ch9 "Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire";

US hegemony has not declined, as some think it has looking at the chaos of the world around it. Arguement is that it's the misuse of the structural power (undiminished) of the US hegemony that has caused the problems.

Structural Power: (as opposed to relational power, getting another country to do what you want) the ability of a country to determine the way in which certain basic social needs are provided.

Four societal needs for modern world economy: security knowledge production credit.

Production: the kind of purely polictical command (socialist) is shrinking; Entirely market-signalled (some basic food markets) is shrinking; geared towards national markets (governments can adjust with policies); transnational corporations (TNGs). Any TNGs have a significant interest in not pissing off Washington b/c of the huge market share of the territorial US

Argues that US structural power not import/export numbers reliant, but if it can be estimated at all, it is the total alue of goods and service produced by large companies responsive to policy decisions taken by the US govt.

Knowledge: power to determine what knowledge shall be sought. Eg, the continued dominance of US in most of hte high-tech industries. US banks in transborder data flows.

Security: The only structure where US shares power (ie with the USSR at the time). rest of the world relies on either US or USSR as balance, backup.

Argues we need to redefine empires, both in their simple meaning, and in whether we view them as "bad." The American nonterritorial empire preferable to a Soviet or Japanese one. Easier to integreate into American society (as 'semicitizens' can tell you).


This article is rather old, but I wonder if she is addressing the direction of the US's power. Now it would be especially interesting to take that into account with Russia and China re-emerging.

This lady sure is high on America! Would she be surprised to find out other countries have nationalistic slogans, none of which are "We're #2"?

Washington Post; "In Syrica, Iraq's Fate Silences Rights Activists"; Knickmeyer; Oct 2006

Syria, the last Baath-rule country, now isolated since the assassination of the Lebanese PM, now is even less likely to risk discussion of democritizing their country. Firstly because crackdowns are harder (talk of democracy is siding with US=traitorous), but also because at least things are better in Syria than they are in Iraq.

Washington Post; "Embittered Insiders Turn Against Bush"; Baker; Nov 2006

Even some fellow-war-architects turn against Bush on the management of the war. Republicans angry at the midterm defeat--feel if Rumsfeld had been fired earlier, the election would have gone differently. Perle: "If I had know n that hte US was going to essentially establish an occupation, then I'd say, 'Let's not do it,' and instead find another way to target Hussein." Though some say these neocons are just trying to avoid culpability for the war.

Adelman "The whole philoscopy of using American strength for good in hte world, for a foreign policy that is really value-based instead of balanced-power-based, I don't think is disproven by Iraq. But its certainly discredited."

NYT; "Iraq may be prime place for training of militants, CIA Report concludes"; Jehl; 2005

"A new classified assessment by the CIA says Iraq may prove to be an even more effective training ground for Eslamic extremists than Afghanistan was in Al Aaeda's early days, because it is serving as real-world laboratory for urban combat." So those who survived are particularly experienced in urban combat.

Washington Post; "US Figures Show Sharp Rise in Terrorism-State Dept will not put Data in Report"; Glasser; Apr 2005

Because of the sharp increase in reported terror activity, the numbers were not included in a report to congress on the success of the war. Rice et al argued the definition changed, to be more inclusive, so comparing data year to year not accurate. Numbers made public otherwise, just not in report.

San Francisco Chronicle; "In these times, do as ancient Romans did--and survive; negotiate with foes, slash committments"; Arquilla; 2005

Our sense of dominance since becoming the sole military superpower has been more of one of siege--constant small battles. But our military is less flexible than it was for it's post-Pearl Harbor transformation.

Look to Rome at a similar time: "At the political level, Rome sought not to alienate but to attract" (soft power).

"If we muffled our rhetoric about spreading democracy, the world would breathe a huge sigh of relief."

The American Conservative: "Jacobin in Chief: Exporting the French Rev. to the world"; Ryn; 2005

"It should by now be obvious that, in his foreign policy views at minimum, hte president of the U.S. is no conservative. He is a Jacobin nationalist."

"...ideologically charged missionary spirit that bears a striking resemblance to that of hte Jacobins who led the French Revolution."

"The neoconservatives have transformed the old American exceptionalism, which counseled isolation form the world, into an assertive, ideologically intense nationalism, whose smugness seems to know no bounds."

"[in media commentary] neo-Jacobin thinking is todya challenging an older, more diffuse and less vigorous liberalism for pre-eminence."

"According to Irving Kristol, the reputed godfather of neoconservatism, today's US is 'ideological, like the Sovet Union of yesterday.' His son William insists that for America vigorously to promote its universal principles abroad, it must have great military and other governmental might. The old conservative suspicion of strong, centralized federal govenment must be abandoned. According to the elder Kristol, it has been the role of neoconservatism 'to convert the Republican party and conservatism in general, against their will,' to this new conception of government."

"Burke [British father of conservatism] warned specifically against 'liberty' in the abstract."

Washington Post; "The 'Bush Doctrine' experiences Shining Moments"; Milbank; 2003

A week of good things (Libyan's agreeing to inspections, France and Germany working hard with Iran to get it in line) are credited to the Iraq strike and the capture of Saddam. Other countries recognize the US's power and move to accomodate it.

Imperialism Old and New; Ch13: "Farewell To Empire"; 1962

What was colonialism all about? Argues that it was less of an economic thing and more of a prestige thing. While private companies may have made profit from the labor and resources of a colony, the official input shows more money/resources going into the colony. There was some fear of competition from other European powers, and what they might gain (hence the scramble for Africa).

after the world wars, the ruling powers lost all cred. independence was imminent.

Soviets claimed Russian was never imperialist/colonial, but just because their conquered territories were continguous, no other distinction can be made. As other more overtly overseas colonies were liquidated, Russia retained control of all its Turkic territories.

Some lasting effects of imperialism good. Author doubts world attitude would ever be pro-imperialism again, though.

Washington Post; "The Illusion of 'Managing' China"; Kaga; 2005

The idea/phrase of "managing" the rise implies enough time to keep under our own control, and enough time to think through things and not do anything rash. History provides no comfort that this will be the case. A new power arises rarely without the resulting war to really reassess the power differentials. China's rise will be controlled by China, not us.

The Australian; "The rise of China will not be peaceful at all"; Mearsheimer; 2005

China will grow economically over the next decades until neighboring states + US will join together against it. The goal of every state is not only power, but hegemony in the anarchastic inter-country system.

States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: to prevent other geographical areas from being dominated by other great powers.

China probably won't compete miltarily with Russia/Japan, but will find other ways to dictate behavior. Will also eventually try to push US out of Asia. China, strategically so, would prefer a militarily weak Japan and Russia as the US has a militarily weak Canada and Mexico.

US will go to all lengths to weaken China, even in Asia region alone. Likely will behave as toward USSR during cold war.

"[depressing]... but the fact is that international politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."

Washington Post; "US Sanctions with Teeth"; Ignatius; Feb 2007

Old "sanctions" didn't work, eg in Cuba. But North Korea and Iran's sanction different--certain banks can be cut off entirely from the dollar system. Because of globalization, this quarantine basically extends to the entire network. Part of the Patriot Act. Specific banks targeted for egregiously supporting terrorism in some way, but the effect, since host countries suffer, is all countries look more closely for front companies or money laundering operations

New York Times; Tyler; US Strategy plan calls for insuring no rivals develop; 1992

Document from Defense Department, on post-cold war era:

"[The United States] must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order."

"the document was provided to the NYT by an official who believes this post-cold war strategy debate should be carried out in the public domain."

The document implicitly most fears Germany and Japan (!).

What was the aftermath of this report's draft leak??

"Fundamental Attribution Error"

The injury we do and the one we suffer are not weighed in the same scale.~ Aesop

Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac.~ George Orwell

(more...)

The Web of War; Ch 8 "The Abacus of Power"

Balance of Power; Clausewitz (Prussian soldier; On War)

• A dominant nation can preserve the peace simply by its ability to keep inferior nations in order.
  -or-
• A nation which is too powerful endangers the peace

"balance of power" misleadingly simple

"Most believers in the balance of power think that a world of many powerful states tends to be more peaceful." (Waltz's article referenced bipolarity as the other great-peacekeeper besides nuclear power). "In the nuclear age...two great power were prefereable to eight. The danger of a crisis that slipped from control was diminished if two powers dominated the world." (only quoted here as a link to the Waltz article).

"...no historian ...produced evidence to confirm that a power system of seven strong states was more conducive teo peace than a system of two strong states. The idea relies much on analogies" ('two legged table unsteady'; bicycles; virtues of free economic competition)

Balance of power: not a formula for peace, but for national independence. Prevents the rise of a nation to world dominance.

Survey of wars from 1700-1815 in the reading suggests decicive victories, strong victors, lead to longer periods of peace. Idea of a neat ledger of power at the end of the war, the ideal time to measure it.

Wars begin with diplomacy breakdown, in turn caused by both sides having conflicting estimates of their bargaining power. "It is not the actual distribution of power that is vital: it is rather the way in which national leaders think that power is distributed." "War is a disbute about the measure of power" p114

Wars after 1815 shorter, more decisive, with longer periods of peace. However, the agreement about nations' bargaining power (i.e. wars with a clearly superior country, even if level is not precise) rarely lasted as long as one generation..

Fear of trounced country rising again gives co-victors reason to stay united rather than fight each other for further dominance setting on the ladder. Also, seeing allies during a war's military strength may inhibit countries from attacking them (ie US and Russia after WWII).

Balance of power replaced with Balance of Terror in the nuclear age. Some argue two powers now more stable. Others argue stalemates exists prior to nuclear capabilities.

"Agreement depends not only on an assessment of the might of hthe enemy but a prediction of the costs and profits of fighting rather than negotiating." "War itself is a dispute about measurement; peace on the other hand marks a rough agreement aout measurement." p122

Nations' assessing their strength:

1. military strength
2. predictions of outside nations reaction
3. perceptions of internal unity (their own and enemy's)
4. memory of forgetfulness of realities of war
5. perceptions of prosperity and ability to sustain a war
6. nationalism and ideology
7. personality and mental qualities of the leaders.

If these combine to make a nation think it's powerful, war may be soon... Confidence a big overarching factor. Optimism usually precedes a war.

Dissertation: Critiques of Rational Deterrence Theory; Kuperman

Rational Deterrance Theory: Country A won't be aggressive to Country B unless the potential gains far outweigh the potential losses (connects back to the idea of why Waltz argues for a safer world, armed to the teeth with nuclear arms.)

Most common critiques undermining this rational cost/benefit theory: misperception, domestic politics, external considerations, prospect theory, bureaucratic politics, computational limitations.

1. Misperception (Jervis): Calculated or innocent misperception means decisions cannot be rational. However, misperception is a part of rational deterrance theory--otherwise the theory would predict that no wars would be lost by its starter.
2. Domestic Politics (R Lebow, J Stein): country leaders are indeed rational, and therefore seek to optimize their personal wellbeing.
3. External considerations: some of the benefits in the equation may be more long-term, therefore making a country seem like it's acting irrationally.
4. Prospect Theory: decision-makers value prospective losses more highly than objectively equivalent prospective gains. Therefore, decision wouldn't be made on just net outcome. The potential gains would have to be significantly higher than losses.
5. *Bureaucratic politics: sometimes the rational decision may not be implemented because of this. However, such paths are usually bypassed for crucial military decisions.
6. *Lack of computational abilities. Not the same as misperception. Reasons: crisis pressures, bureaucratic politics, cognitive limitations. Last one: state cannot make rational decisions for the same reasons humans can't: information processing demands are too great. JS Mill "[human behavior stems from habit rather than rational calculation.]"

*Author feels these are legitamite alternatives.

Fiascos; "Why So Many Miscalculations?"

Imperfections of group decisions; Effects of group cohesiveness; groupthink

Main idea: Groupthink=fiasco

"The potentially detrimental effect of group cohesiveness were emphasized by another theorst, Wilfred Bion, an eminent group therapist. Bion described how the efficienty of all working groups can be adversely affected by the preconscious myths and misconceptions of their mutually dependent members--that is, by shared basic assumptions that tend to preserive the group without regard for the work at hand."
p 4

Conceptions of political decision making (p6)

1. "rational actor" theory--aims to determine the ends of the political actor by means of the policy he has chosen.
2. Taking into account "organizational rigidities" such as routines and procedures of bureaucratic organizations that grind out platitudes about what can be done to attain objectives.
3. Intrusions of the games of domestic and local bureacratic politics into the dangerous competitive games of international relations.
4. group dynamics approach: paying closer attention to the behavior of the small group of decision-makers

Groupthink: when someone deviates from the group's reasoning, rather than explore the new line of thought, subtle "ganging up" takes place trying to bring them back in line. Group cohesion becomes all important.

Quote: "The invidiousness [of the Orwell-esque word] is intentional: Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures."

Major defects in decision-making policy:

1. Groups discussion limited to a few (often 2) courses of action, not a survey/range.
2. Objectives filled and values implicated by decision not examined.
3. No reexamination of decision preferred by the majority for less obvious failures.
4. No reexamination of decisions initially rejected by majority.
5. No attempt to get more information from experts.
6. Little interest in facts/opinions that don't support their initial majority vote.
7. Little discussion on how chosen policy to be hindered by bureaucratic inertia, sabotaged by politics etc. Therefore, no contingency plans.