Dissertation: Critiques of Rational Deterrence Theory; Kuperman

Rational Deterrance Theory: Country A won't be aggressive to Country B unless the potential gains far outweigh the potential losses (connects back to the idea of why Waltz argues for a safer world, armed to the teeth with nuclear arms.)

Most common critiques undermining this rational cost/benefit theory: misperception, domestic politics, external considerations, prospect theory, bureaucratic politics, computational limitations.

1. Misperception (Jervis): Calculated or innocent misperception means decisions cannot be rational. However, misperception is a part of rational deterrance theory--otherwise the theory would predict that no wars would be lost by its starter.
2. Domestic Politics (R Lebow, J Stein): country leaders are indeed rational, and therefore seek to optimize their personal wellbeing.
3. External considerations: some of the benefits in the equation may be more long-term, therefore making a country seem like it's acting irrationally.
4. Prospect Theory: decision-makers value prospective losses more highly than objectively equivalent prospective gains. Therefore, decision wouldn't be made on just net outcome. The potential gains would have to be significantly higher than losses.
5. *Bureaucratic politics: sometimes the rational decision may not be implemented because of this. However, such paths are usually bypassed for crucial military decisions.
6. *Lack of computational abilities. Not the same as misperception. Reasons: crisis pressures, bureaucratic politics, cognitive limitations. Last one: state cannot make rational decisions for the same reasons humans can't: information processing demands are too great. JS Mill "[human behavior stems from habit rather than rational calculation.]"

*Author feels these are legitamite alternatives.