Friday, September 28, 2007

Source List: To Be Updated as I get more

Legend:
gray text unknown
blue text - broad level of theory/analysis
green text - mid-level of theory/analysis (edible schoolyard theory-specific)
red text - specific/close level of theory/analysis (NOLA edible schoolyard theory-specific)

Books



  • (? book?) The Edible Schoolyard. Capra, Fritjof; Comnes, Leslie; Cook, Esther; Hawkins, David; Jackson, Wes; McCullough, Yvette; Waters, Alice. Center for Ecoliteracy, 2522 San Pablo Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94702, 1999

  • The agrarian roots of pragmatism. 1st ed.Thompson, Paul B. and Hilde, Thomas C.Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000; section: "Armen Marsoobian -- The edible schoolyard: agrarian ideals and our industrial milieu"

Journal Articles



  • School-based research and initiatives: fruit and vegetable environment, policy, and pricing workshop. M Settings - Preventive Medicine, 2004 - Elsevier

  • Hungry for change: chef Alice Waters is convinced that the path to awakening students' minds to their environment is through their stomachs, so she's helped them build a schoolyard--and make it edible. (education). Jennifer Bogo. Audubon 104.2 (March-April 2002): p30(4). (1848 words)

  • Environmental Justice Education: Empowering Students to Become Environmental CitizensJ Peloso - Penn GSE Perspectives on Urban Education, 2007

  • Shpard, P.M., Northridge, M.E., Prakash, S. & Stover, G. (2002). Preface: Advancing environmental justice through community-based participatory research. Environmental Heath Perspectives, 100 (20), 139-140

  • Agrawal, A. "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation." World Development 27.4 (1999):629-.
Other



Wednesday, September 26, 2007

Universitas

Only related to that fact that I'm in a large university for the first time in a long while, I'm overcome lately at how clear the synergistic effects of pooling human ingenuity can be. I think I'm lucky to be at the LBJ school in particular (I've been in equally demanding, but much more competitive academic settings in the past, and I would never have been inspired to write a post like this about them). The cooperative learning environment is what I believe will make the most significant social contribution. Possibly the more competitive law and business schools will bring greater achievement of a certain kind to the individual students, but I wonder at how much new ground is covered when "networking" there has different connotations from what I describe below.

This feels obvious, and will be obvious to anyone already at the university. But just think! Individuals who have amassed a great deal of knowledge, in some cases a lifetime's worth, every day stand for 3 hours and try to pour this knowledge into as many ears as can sign up for courses. But not only that, a TA or even student, for instance, can make their own connections between wildly disparate classes they are taking, and the idea can spontaneously emerge, not necessarily because the student is intellectually superior, but because they are exposed to a rare combination of ideas. I think pinpointing that the student does not necessarily have to be a genius to have a significant idea or contribution really shows the way in which they are a node in a system, that their community is as much responsible for the burgeoning idea as the individual herself (or himself).

I know we talked about this in the first two classes, and I think in some ways the focus on pragmatism and land-grant universities, as well as my natural distaste for elitist ideas, made this concept not as obvious to me. But, as Professor Rhodes said, "how do we be elite without being elitist?" We clearly have to recognize that a university is a great resource, but by no means the only one. We also need to make sure that these brilliant, spontaneously-generated ideas make it outside of the university setting, where they can actually be of use.

Incidentally, from Wikipedia:
The word university is derived from the Latin universitas magistrorum et scholarium, roughly meaning "community of teachers and scholars".

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Capra: Hidden Connections [book]

Concept/Connection 1

Recognize that there is an important link between matter and process. This is a departure from the Cartesians (starting with "I think therefore I am") who see the brain and the mind as separate areas of study. Capra argues that they truly are aspects of one and the same system.

Similarly, The Santiago Theory of Cognition connects this process of cognition with the essense of life itself. With this and other series of metaphor, I think Capra is drawing the conlucsion that just as humans (a collection of cells working together) are a life form, a social network or community (a collection of humans working together) is also a life form in its own right.

In this same argument for what constitutes life, he seems to stress that pure cognition is not really what defines it, any more than DNA or RNA (which he argues out of the picture earlier on). Therefore, as I see his arguments laid out, a social network itself would be more of a life form than a truly conscious AI, or computer program that could exactly mimic every neuron capability in a human's brain.


Concept/Connection 2:


Process
/ \
Form ---- Matter


These are the three aspects that define anything. The fourth, overarching aspect which connects to all of them is Meaning (I can't draw the pyramid of the four aspects here, however), though meaning wasn't considered a legitimate aspect of the study of social sciences until the positivists of the time eased up on the "measuring" (echoes of the Capra article of weeks ago with the unhelpful stress on the measuring of things, which generally focuses on the 'matter' or sometimes 'form' because they are easiest to quantify and describe).

Interesting quote and example about the work of Giddens, who was one of the first to transition to more integrative theories of studying social phenomena:
The interaction between social structures and human agency is cyclical, according to Giddens. Social structures are both the precondition and the unintended outcome of people's agency. People draw upon them in order to engage in their daily social practices, and in so doing they cannot help but reproduce the very same structures.

For example, when we speak we necessarily draw upon the rules of our language, and as we use language we continually reproduce and transform the very same semantic structures. Thus social structures both enable us to interact and are also reproduced by our interactions. Giddens calls this the "duality of structure," and he acknowledges the similarily to the circular nature of autopoietic* networks in biology.

p78-79
*(simply, things that can create, or in this case continually re-create, themselves; this is what Capra feels is the defining characteristic of life)


Other
A section on power notes that having authorities (those that have the knowledge to make a decision and act) are sometimes necessary in a group which may encounter conflicts of interest. It is not by nature an evil, but if power passes to someone who is not an authority, it ceases to be helpful and becomes potentially exploitative.
While I found the other chapters interesting, I mostly skimmed them because I think the most clear ideas he has here relating to community and social theory are above. If I had more time, I would write up on the chapter "The Networks of Global Capitalism," as I am finding myself drawn again and again to this idea of "global community" (and finding in what ways that is not an oxymoron). However, for the scope of this class, and what I am trying to focus my research topic on, I will hold off :)

First Microbes, Now Plants!

Clever plants chat over the network

This is just a brief brainwave because I don't feel it's particularly on-topic. But a lot of articles recently have really made me question our assumptions about the distinctions we as humans make between life-forms. But between microbes and plants (above link) forming these networks, to the recently dead parrot with the intelligence of a child (how intelligent are other animals that simply can't express themselves in human sounds?), I really am rethinking a lot of things. And this is coming from someone who for 15 years has been a vegetarian for moral reasons. I think a lot of this has also been informed by Capra's book, but more on that in its own post.

Monday, September 24, 2007

Susan Strange; Global Change and Theoretical Challenges ch9 "Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire";

US hegemony has not declined, as some think it has looking at the chaos of the world around it. Arguement is that it's the misuse of the structural power (undiminished) of the US hegemony that has caused the problems.

Structural Power: (as opposed to relational power, getting another country to do what you want) the ability of a country to determine the way in which certain basic social needs are provided.

Four societal needs for modern world economy: security knowledge production credit.

Production: the kind of purely polictical command (socialist) is shrinking; Entirely market-signalled (some basic food markets) is shrinking; geared towards national markets (governments can adjust with policies); transnational corporations (TNGs). Any TNGs have a significant interest in not pissing off Washington b/c of the huge market share of the territorial US

Argues that US structural power not import/export numbers reliant, but if it can be estimated at all, it is the total alue of goods and service produced by large companies responsive to policy decisions taken by the US govt.

Knowledge: power to determine what knowledge shall be sought. Eg, the continued dominance of US in most of hte high-tech industries. US banks in transborder data flows.

Security: The only structure where US shares power (ie with the USSR at the time). rest of the world relies on either US or USSR as balance, backup.

Argues we need to redefine empires, both in their simple meaning, and in whether we view them as "bad." The American nonterritorial empire preferable to a Soviet or Japanese one. Easier to integreate into American society (as 'semicitizens' can tell you).


This article is rather old, but I wonder if she is addressing the direction of the US's power. Now it would be especially interesting to take that into account with Russia and China re-emerging.

This lady sure is high on America! Would she be surprised to find out other countries have nationalistic slogans, none of which are "We're #2"?

Washington Post; "In Syrica, Iraq's Fate Silences Rights Activists"; Knickmeyer; Oct 2006

Syria, the last Baath-rule country, now isolated since the assassination of the Lebanese PM, now is even less likely to risk discussion of democritizing their country. Firstly because crackdowns are harder (talk of democracy is siding with US=traitorous), but also because at least things are better in Syria than they are in Iraq.

Washington Post; "Embittered Insiders Turn Against Bush"; Baker; Nov 2006

Even some fellow-war-architects turn against Bush on the management of the war. Republicans angry at the midterm defeat--feel if Rumsfeld had been fired earlier, the election would have gone differently. Perle: "If I had know n that hte US was going to essentially establish an occupation, then I'd say, 'Let's not do it,' and instead find another way to target Hussein." Though some say these neocons are just trying to avoid culpability for the war.

Adelman "The whole philoscopy of using American strength for good in hte world, for a foreign policy that is really value-based instead of balanced-power-based, I don't think is disproven by Iraq. But its certainly discredited."

NYT; "Iraq may be prime place for training of militants, CIA Report concludes"; Jehl; 2005

"A new classified assessment by the CIA says Iraq may prove to be an even more effective training ground for Eslamic extremists than Afghanistan was in Al Aaeda's early days, because it is serving as real-world laboratory for urban combat." So those who survived are particularly experienced in urban combat.

Washington Post; "US Figures Show Sharp Rise in Terrorism-State Dept will not put Data in Report"; Glasser; Apr 2005

Because of the sharp increase in reported terror activity, the numbers were not included in a report to congress on the success of the war. Rice et al argued the definition changed, to be more inclusive, so comparing data year to year not accurate. Numbers made public otherwise, just not in report.

San Francisco Chronicle; "In these times, do as ancient Romans did--and survive; negotiate with foes, slash committments"; Arquilla; 2005

Our sense of dominance since becoming the sole military superpower has been more of one of siege--constant small battles. But our military is less flexible than it was for it's post-Pearl Harbor transformation.

Look to Rome at a similar time: "At the political level, Rome sought not to alienate but to attract" (soft power).

"If we muffled our rhetoric about spreading democracy, the world would breathe a huge sigh of relief."
Types of misperception: (these are first level of analysis because based on human failings)
Fundamental attribution error (state acting rationally but you interpret as evil intent).
First state assumes other state acting rationally (could be, for example, bureaucratic politics, if they are not considered possible reasons for action).Eg: some psychological factors cause irrational actions (Jervis lists many):groupthink (sort of a type of misperception)Mirror-imaging—when you look at others, you assume they are like you (sort of opposite of fundamental attribution error). Both of these are biased on assumptions of intent not based in fact. Culture is a key concept here: what is it? Beliefs/values that are society-wide.
(more of Jervis:)instrumental goals become reified, even after significant changes. Like a treaty you assume is as important as ever. It’s human nature to hang onto ideas, even after utility outlived.Eg: anti-ballistic missile treaty. But then Cold War ended, so we might want a missile defense for rogue states. The fact that it was an instrument for an original, specific problem is forgotten.Eg NATO originally against Soviets
Having past experiences with traumatic events will color reactions. Eg: Hitler::Milosovic/Saddam/Akhmadinjad comparisons. We take the lesson to never appease anyone.
Tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized.
If the bad guy does something we like—it’s our influence, not that they turned good, or chance. But we learn lesson to repeat whatever we did, whether or not it was actually influential.
Not misperception, but worth thinking about: propaganda. Should not affect why the STATE goes to war—just why citizens back it.

Bureaucratic Politics
How do people in government decide what policies to favor (covered last class)
How does government enact the eventual choice?
Your interest narrower than national interest (Morgenthau) (your job, you agency’s survival).
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): For example, something made sense in the past, but may be no longer applicable).
How do interests get aggregated? Different groups [come?] up with difference courses of action. Meetings with individuals—lobbying, personal decisions. So it really depends on the government set up how the ideas are pulled together.
How do decisions get implemented?
§ Agencies may not comply—failure to succeed (if truly an impossible goal, not really bureaucratic politics.
§ Someone who didn’t like the policy in the first place could delay, sabotage till no longer applicable. Eg. People who disagreed with giving weapons to Afghanistan.
So there, rational decision processes that get waylaid.

Groupthink: Closely related to individual errors, but always occur group of individuals. First image theory, but different from simple misperception. Eg: Bay of Pigs. Somewhat personal psychology of wanting to belong to a group. But also, lack of access to power (Eg: Colin Powell’s eventual “support” of the war). Is this real reason, or just a justification? Since if you always kowtow, there is no real power to preserve.
Groups can make this additional mistake over the individual—by recognizing misperception but not saying anything. Not always the case.
Is groupthink ever good? Eg military, pro-ethnic diversity (racists rejected, silenced)
Patterns with bad groupthink. Difficulty with after the screw-up, admitting mistakes.

Other Jervis reading (spirals): *fundamentally important reading*
Point touches on one Morgenthau.
“One’s prescription is another’s proscription”
Deterrence—to threaten the other side
Appeasement—give them what they want, don’t provoke them.
Which do you do? Depends on what? Incorrect decision leads to loss of security, annihilation. Interesting problems are when outcomes include your own downfall. Jervis describes states generally threatening. Prescription: threaten and aggressor, appease a status-quo state. Can’t necessarily determine what kind of state it is by its specific demands. Threatening a status quo state leads to spiral of threat/aggression.

Status quo
Aggressive
Threaten
Transformed to revolutionary state=
WAR
Back down=
PEACE
Appease
PEACE
“give an inch, it takes a mile” = WAR
They can’t be a appeased, and now you’re fighting a stronger state.

What helps you determine its intentions? Military trends? No—actions of a state give you no way to know for sure. Intent commonly misperceived (as we saw today).

Sawyer—why is Osama a “hero” to some? Muslims feel attacked, they change their intent as a result of our action, our policies which are seen as attacking them. Examples of US attack on world of Islam: troops in Saudi Arabia (Arabian Peninsula where infidels should not be). East Timor vs. Indonesia—Osama viewed it as hurting an Islamic state for the sake of creating a Catholic state, even if the Indonesians did not feel that way. Even if US invited onto Arabian Peninsula, elsewhere we appear to be the aggressor. Blocking Islamic charitable donations. All of these are policies that may have valid goals, but they aren’t examined in terms of how outsiders would perceive them. Long list of reasons for why Muslim people would hate US for what we do not who we are.

Realism and Change
Up to now, our realism studies have been snapshot theories. Realism theory predicts the simple thing that will always remain true. But things sometimes will change somewhat. EG power changes, relative power changes.
Why does relative power of states change? War could cause it; economic conditions; shocks (eg drought) leads to economic change; technology.
How often do states expand when they have the ability? White says never. Is this offensive or defensive realism? Could be either. So power expansion doesn’t tell us if they’re revolutionary or status quo.
Has the drive for territorial colonialism gone away? Since realism doesn’t change, where has this drive gone? Economic control of territories, eg quid pro quo with Saudi Arabia. Financial markets controlled by US.
So form of the power dynamic has changed; people may have realized the cost of territorial colonialism.
Ottaway and Lacina: New forms of international interventions. Humanitarian, generally. Who benefited, who lost? Hard power to increase soft power. So truly humanitarian not intended to benefit the intervener. So, how’s Kosovo doing now? Now Albanians discriminate against the Serbs. Is that good?? We still have 17,000 troops in Kososvo. The constant is that the strong like to meddle in the affairs of the weak. Also, not much sign that it really works.

Hegemonic Stability
(reading: Kindleberger on the 1929 Depression)
Two definitions:
Hegemon: more power than all the other states combined (unipolarity)
Hegemon: state with more power than any individual state. This is the functional definition which is part of the hegemonic stability theory.

Hegemon can keep the peace (by being the “world’s policeman”). Any nations fight, and the hegemon has enough power to have its way despite the will of others.

Hegemonic stability also applies to economic stability (Kindleberger’s focus more on economics). Think subprime failure of this year—all aspects of world economy quickly affected. But why didn’t we get a sudden depression? The Fed can provide liquidity for the entire world. Because the US can provide enough resources to back up markets worldwide. If everyone in the world had equal power/money, no one country could bail out the whole world crisis by adding liquidity. This is the advantage of an economic hegemon. Public good can be provided, either as security, or lender of last resort. Otherwise, all states would have to coordinate interest rates etc. (Gilpin and Copeland).

Does the hegemon benefit less than the smaller powers?

Note: Image opposes previous images that small states would join together against the larger.

The American Conservative: "Jacobin in Chief: Exporting the French Rev. to the world"; Ryn; 2005

"It should by now be obvious that, in his foreign policy views at minimum, hte president of the U.S. is no conservative. He is a Jacobin nationalist."

"...ideologically charged missionary spirit that bears a striking resemblance to that of hte Jacobins who led the French Revolution."

"The neoconservatives have transformed the old American exceptionalism, which counseled isolation form the world, into an assertive, ideologically intense nationalism, whose smugness seems to know no bounds."

"[in media commentary] neo-Jacobin thinking is todya challenging an older, more diffuse and less vigorous liberalism for pre-eminence."

"According to Irving Kristol, the reputed godfather of neoconservatism, today's US is 'ideological, like the Sovet Union of yesterday.' His son William insists that for America vigorously to promote its universal principles abroad, it must have great military and other governmental might. The old conservative suspicion of strong, centralized federal govenment must be abandoned. According to the elder Kristol, it has been the role of neoconservatism 'to convert the Republican party and conservatism in general, against their will,' to this new conception of government."

"Burke [British father of conservatism] warned specifically against 'liberty' in the abstract."

Sunday, September 23, 2007

Washington Post; "The 'Bush Doctrine' experiences Shining Moments"; Milbank; 2003

A week of good things (Libyan's agreeing to inspections, France and Germany working hard with Iran to get it in line) are credited to the Iraq strike and the capture of Saddam. Other countries recognize the US's power and move to accomodate it.

Imperialism Old and New; Ch13: "Farewell To Empire"; 1962

What was colonialism all about? Argues that it was less of an economic thing and more of a prestige thing. While private companies may have made profit from the labor and resources of a colony, the official input shows more money/resources going into the colony. There was some fear of competition from other European powers, and what they might gain (hence the scramble for Africa).

after the world wars, the ruling powers lost all cred. independence was imminent.

Soviets claimed Russian was never imperialist/colonial, but just because their conquered territories were continguous, no other distinction can be made. As other more overtly overseas colonies were liquidated, Russia retained control of all its Turkic territories.

Some lasting effects of imperialism good. Author doubts world attitude would ever be pro-imperialism again, though.

Washington Post; "The Illusion of 'Managing' China"; Kaga; 2005

The idea/phrase of "managing" the rise implies enough time to keep under our own control, and enough time to think through things and not do anything rash. History provides no comfort that this will be the case. A new power arises rarely without the resulting war to really reassess the power differentials. China's rise will be controlled by China, not us.

The Australian; "The rise of China will not be peaceful at all"; Mearsheimer; 2005

China will grow economically over the next decades until neighboring states + US will join together against it. The goal of every state is not only power, but hegemony in the anarchastic inter-country system.

States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: to prevent other geographical areas from being dominated by other great powers.

China probably won't compete miltarily with Russia/Japan, but will find other ways to dictate behavior. Will also eventually try to push US out of Asia. China, strategically so, would prefer a militarily weak Japan and Russia as the US has a militarily weak Canada and Mexico.

US will go to all lengths to weaken China, even in Asia region alone. Likely will behave as toward USSR during cold war.

"[depressing]... but the fact is that international politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."

Washington Post; "US Sanctions with Teeth"; Ignatius; Feb 2007

Old "sanctions" didn't work, eg in Cuba. But North Korea and Iran's sanction different--certain banks can be cut off entirely from the dollar system. Because of globalization, this quarantine basically extends to the entire network. Part of the Patriot Act. Specific banks targeted for egregiously supporting terrorism in some way, but the effect, since host countries suffer, is all countries look more closely for front companies or money laundering operations

New York Times; Tyler; US Strategy plan calls for insuring no rivals develop; 1992

Document from Defense Department, on post-cold war era:

"[The United States] must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order."

"the document was provided to the NYT by an official who believes this post-cold war strategy debate should be carried out in the public domain."

The document implicitly most fears Germany and Japan (!).

What was the aftermath of this report's draft leak??

Linux Map

http://www.listphile.com/Linux

"Fundamental Attribution Error"

The injury we do and the one we suffer are not weighed in the same scale.~ Aesop

Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defense against a homicidal maniac.~ George Orwell

(more...)

Monday, September 17, 2007

Russian Transportation/Greenhouse Gas data sources

Policy:

Data:

The Web of War; Ch 8 "The Abacus of Power"

Balance of Power; Clausewitz (Prussian soldier; On War)

  • A dominant nation can preserve the peace simply by its ability to keep inferior nations in order.
    -or-
  • A nation which is too powerful endangers the peace

"balance of power" misleadingly simple

"Most believers in the balance of power think that a world of many powerful states tends to be more peaceful." (Waltz's article referenced bipolarity as the other great-peacekeeper besides nuclear power). "In the nuclear age...two great power were prefereable to eight. The danger of a crisis that slipped from control was diminished if two powers dominated the world." (only quoted here as a link to the Waltz article).

"...no historian ...produced evidence to confirm that a power system of seven strong states was more conducive teo peace than a system of two strong states. The idea relies much on analogies" ('two legged table unsteady'; bicycles; virtues of free economic competition)

Balance of power: not a formula for peace, but for national independence. Prevents the rise of a nation to world dominance.

Survey of wars from 1700-1815 in the reading suggests decicive victories, strong victors, lead to longer periods of peace. Idea of a neat ledger of power at the end of the war, the ideal time to measure it.

Wars begin with diplomacy breakdown, in turn caused by both sides having conflicting estimates of their bargaining power. "It is not the actual distribution of power that is vital: it is rather the way in which national leaders think that power is distributed." "War is a disbute about the measure of power" p114

Wars after 1815 shorter, more decisive, with longer periods of peace. However, the agreement about nations' bargaining power (i.e. wars with a clearly superior country, even if level is not precise) rarely lasted as long as one generation..

Fear of trounced country rising again gives co-victors reason to stay united rather than fight each other for further dominance setting on the ladder. Also, seeing allies during a war's military strength may inhibit countries from attacking them (ie US and Russia after WWII).

Balance of power replaced with Balance of Terror in the nuclear age. Some argue two powers now more stable. Others argue stalemates exists prior to nuclear capabilities.

"Agreement depends not only on an assessment of the might of hthe enemy but a prediction of the costs and profits of fighting rather than negotiating." "War itself is a dispute about measurement; peace on the other hand marks a rough agreement aout measurement." p122

Nations' assessing their strength:

  1. military strength
  2. predictions of outside nations reaction
  3. perceptions of internal unity (their own and enemy's)
  4. memory of forgetfulness of realities of war
  5. perceptions of prosperity and ability to sustain a war
  6. nationalism and ideology
  7. personality and mental qualities of the leaders.

If these combine to make a nation think it's powerful, war may be soon... Confidence a big overarching factor. Optimism usually precedes a war.

Dissertation: Critiques of Rational Deterrence Theory; Kuperman

Rational Deterrance Theory: Country A won't be aggressive to Country B unless the potential gains far outweigh the potential losses (connects back to the idea of why Waltz argues for a safer world, armed to the teeth with nuclear arms.)

Most common critiques undermining this rational cost/benefit theory: misperception, domestic politics, external considerations, prospect theory, bureaucratic politics, computational limitations.
  1. Misperception (Jervis): Calculated or innocent misperception means decisions cannot be rational. However, misperception is a part of rational deterrance theory--otherwise the theory would predict that no wars would be lost by its starter.
  2. Domestic Politics (R Lebow, J Stein): country leaders are indeed rational, and therefore seek to optimize their personal wellbeing.
  3. External considerations: some of the benefits in the equation may be more long-term, therefore making a country seem like it's acting irrationally.
  4. Prospect Theory: decision-makers value prospective losses more highly than objectively equivalent prospective gains. Therefore, decision wouldn't be made on just net outcome. The potential gains would have to be significantly higher than losses.
  5. *Bureaucratic politics: sometimes the rational decision may not be implemented because of this. However, such paths are usually bypassed for crucial military decisions.
  6. *Lack of computational abilities. Not the same as misperception. Reasons: crisis pressures, bureaucratic politics, cognitive limitations. Last one: state cannot make rational decisions for the same reasons humans can't: information processing demands are too great. JS Mill "[human behavior stems from habit rather than rational calculation.]"

*Author feels these are legitamite alternatives.

Fiascos; "Why So Many Miscalculations?"

Imperfections of group decisions; Effects of group cohesiveness; groupthink

Main idea: Groupthink=fiasco

"The potentially detrimental effect of group cohesiveness were emphasized by another theorst, Wilfred Bion, an eminent group therapist. Bion described how the efficienty of all working groups can be adversely affected by the preconscious myths and misconceptions of their mutually dependent members--that is, by shared basic assumptions that tend to preserive the group without regard for the work at hand."
p 4

Conceptions of political decision making (p6)
  1. "rational actor" theory--aims to determine the ends of the political actor by means of the policy he has chosen.
  2. Taking into account "organizational rigidities" such as routines and procedures of bureaucratic organizations that grind out platitudes about what can be done to attain objectives.
  3. Intrusions of the games of domestic and local bureacratic politics into the dangerous competitive games of international relations.
  4. group dynamics approach: paying closer attention to the behavior of the small group of decision-makers

Groupthink: when someone deviates from the group's reasoning, rather than explore the new line of thought, subtle "ganging up" takes place trying to bring them back in line. Group cohesion becomes all important.

Quote: "The invidiousness [of the Orwell-esque word] is intentional: Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures."

Major defects in decision-making policy:

  1. Groups discussion limited to a few (often 2) courses of action, not a survey/range.
  2. Objectives filled and values implicated by decision not examined.
  3. No reexamination of decision preferred by the majority for less obvious failures.
  4. No reexamination of decisions initially rejected by majority.
  5. No attempt to get more information from experts.
  6. Little interest in facts/opinions that don't support their initial majority vote.
  7. Little discussion on how chosen policy to be hindered by bureaucratic inertia, sabotaged by politics etc. Therefore, no contingency plans.

Washington Post; "China's Law on Taiwan Backfires Anti-Seccesaion Measure Hurts Efforts Abroad"; Cody; Mar 2005

China passed a law codifying its stance that China will now allow Taiwanese independence. They saw it as a way to stave off Taiwan's president Chen from getting any ideas (he was asserting independance more, changing names from People's Republic of China to Taiwan etc.). Chinese officials were surprised when other countries condemned the law, so they backed down on it a bit, disappointed that it had cooled relations between themselves and Taiwan, rather than just laid out the relationship more clearly. Now, Taiwanese seem more strongly behind Chen's sentiments of independance.

TomPaine.com; "Bush's Widening Credibility Gap"; Khouri; Jan 2005

Five problems identified with Bush's inauguration speech, as interpreted by those who experience US foreign policy first hand:
  1. Emphasis on freedom and liberty, when in the developing world, more basic rights are at the fore: national liberation, development, dignity, justice.
  2. Lip service to freedom and democracy in contrast to enduring support for autocrats and dictators, even since the Cold War's end.
  3. Support of Israel by US seen as many Arabs in the region as a support of the subjugation of Palestinians--not liberty. This point identified as the single biggest reason for Arab skepticism of US promises and rhetoric.
  4. Simplistic accusations of terrorists fighting freedom, rather than the reasons they themselves give, make US policies seem artificial, masking ulterior motives.
  5. Pre-emptive warfare seems to be the norm for the US--hints of what may come with Afghanistan and Iran concerning.

"The gap between rhetoric and policy is simply too wide, and has been for many, many years."

Washington Post; "Japan-China Oil Dispute Escalates Relationship Already Uneasy as Tokyo Accuses Beijing of Tapping Diputed Fields"; Faiola; Oct 2005

An oil field which potentially straddles Chinese/Japanese waters, is at the center of a debate between China and Japan. Old grievances seem close to the surface. China is drilling within their own waters, but the field itself seems to be what's under dispute, and negotiations did not go well.

Quote
"We need to take proper measures even at the risk of making the situation more volative. We need to remind China that we are ready and willing to defend our territory and interests."
-Katsuei Hirasawa

Also mention of Japan's extreme loathe to take any measures that could possibly aggressive since WWII.

K Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” in Betts, Conflict and the Cold War

Basic argument: the spread of nuclear weapons would in fact have a pacifying effect on international relations. The more deadly the potential retaliation, and also the less certain others' capabilities are, the more countries will stay in line. The risks are too high for almost any potential gain.

Other points: The distinction between defense (having a strong shield, say, of anti-missile systems) vs. deterrance (having the capability to strike back with such strength the risk of attacking you although you are defenseless is not attractive).

Also a bit on the idea that worry about new nuclear states not having the capability to really develop and control nuclear arms is a bit condescending--after all, the 2/3 major powers managed our developmental stages just fine. A country won't develop a nuclear arms without the proper technicians and officials in place.

My reactions: While all of the potential arguments I could think of are dealt with, I feel the weak point is in the first argument: "It hasn't happened so far, why does that make the future seem even more dire?" I don't think it does make the future seem any more or less dire that we have so far made it through more than half a century will multiple nuclear states. The worry that he doesn't address is that once that row of dominoes that is the "stabilizing" deterrant effect of multiple countries with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons is put into play, we really just need a handful of bombings to create catastrophe. While it is reasonable to remind oneself that the leader of a country would be mindful of the responsibility required in having nuclear capabilities, it is not assured the ease of world catastrophe would be prevented by logical thinking.

First Post

This is an experiment. A place to keep all my thoughts about my various readings in one place, and maybe link between them.

realism, continued

Morgenthau: how does he differ from previous realists? Formalizes the theory. Does he believe in reality that all states want to increase power? Some want to expand, some want to preserve. Imperialist and revolutionary power. But are there other types of states (theories not always emphasizing goodness of fit). “Reality is deficient in this respect.” So why is the theory so useful? Better to be prepared for the worst. Is there a down-side to using a theory this way? Misperception, misuse of resources. He never makes explicit these reasons and downsides.

Analytic and normative aspects of theory. Realism—analytic: “States maximize power.” Normative: “As a state, you should act this way to keep power balanced.” But the second statement in theory unnecessary if the first statement is true.

Balance of Power: Various meanings. Be specific what you mean when you use it.
Measurement: “correlation of forces.” (Sonets(??)); balance can favor ones(?)
Balance of Power as strategy/choice: think Bismarck. Smaller states joining to balance a larger power. Eg., in a system of five powers, you always need to be allied with three.
As a law of international politics. Something states do naturally (as opposed to the “strategy” definition). Eg. Waltz


Morgenthau: Definition of “power”: some elements:
Geography (eg UK is island, Switzerland has mountains). Difficulty to invade (thing Russia vs Belgium). However, not manipulable, must adapt, compensate.
Natural resources: not always correlated; need to concert to power; stronger power wanting to have close alliance, colonize; economic power=potential military power, autonomy. Ability to mobilize, build your own military. Ability to survive an embargo.
Population—from which military can arise, allowing people to continue industry back home. Also take into account rough technological equivalence. You can afford more losses. Iran’s “human waves.” (Iran’s only superiority was numbers).
National morale. Percent of citizen willing to fight (think Vietnam).

(Levels of analysis
people—Machiavelli, Morganthau
states—
International system—Waltz )

[Theories:
Bandwagoning
Balance of Power
“Birds of a Feather” (<-constructivist)
Balance of Threat (similar to collective security; not realist strategy/policy)]

Waltz: explicit differences between Waltz’s “Theory of International…” and other realists. Machiavelli, for example, says states act how they do because of human nature (humans want power, therefore states want power). Waltz however focuses on the anarchy of states; his theory rooted in the international system. Known as “structural realist” or “neorealist.”

Neorealist: breaks down into defense (Waltz) and offensive)

Waltz: Balance of Power as law. Inevitability, though state may put choice and intention behind it—ally with weaker states against stronger. (When would a state sally with larger power? If you have no choice, Melians should have bandwagoned, for instance). But does this happen in reality? In a real-life analogy, does it seem logical (wouldn’t you want to befriend the biggest kid on the block?). But Waltz’s smaller alliances preserve a state’s autonomy. Ideology (“birds of a feather”) doesn’t matter—smaller power causes alliances more than anything. Even if big states pacifist—intentions are transient (second level of analysis), but power in enduring.
States looking to survive, no maximize power. “States can seldom survive trying to maximize power as goal.” Because it creates enemies, puts your security at risk.

Walt: Waltz’s student. State doesn’t balance on basis of power—law is wrong. States will, instead, make alliances based on how much a state is a threat. (Also disagrees with “birds of a feather”). One state attacks another, its threat gets bigger, not necessarily its power. Alliances still against the “big” country. Four variables to assess:
1. Power
2. Offensive (military) power
3. Proximity
4. Aggressive intentions. Past performance a good indicator of future actions. So a powerful state may be an attractive ally if it is pacifist/not empirical.

Mearscheimer: Structuralist/neorealist; offensive realist. Different from Waltz because he advises: attack. Because otherwise they will one day be coming after you. Why doesn’t balancing behavior solve this, as Waltz says (when others will ally against you). Think League of Nations. Alliances will be abandoned before an actual attack. Underbalancing, “buck passing.”

Does it pay to be aggressive in the international system? Still debated.

Offense/defense balance: What condition determines whether offense or defense is “right?” How easy is it to conquer another state, all else equal? Answer depends, for example, on military technology, terrain. If all world were Switzerland, defensive balance would make sense. If all were Belgium, offensive would be the norm.

Soft Power (Nye): Part of realism. Difference between definition in academia (where it originated) and in political/media realm. Hard power—military. People do what you want because of threat (implied or explicit). Soft power—no threat. Attractiveness of main state. Can be from propaganda, active convincing.
Money—hard power generally. Economic power money lent with strings attached. Economic sanctions—coercive mechanisms (but if people voluntarily ask your help because of a strong economy, that’s soft power. But most people mean “economic power” as coercive economic power, therefore, technically, hard power). Using hard power to create soft power (eg. Aid during earthquakes, tsunami).
China more attractive because of noninterference. Soft power theory says that smaller countries will begin working with China, not US.
Diplomacyàleverageàcoercionàhard power (quid pro quo—carrot of stick=hard power).

China, Russia, India alliance against sanctions for Iran. What is basis of alliance? Economic interest?

Why do many countries ally with Russia currently? Inconsistent with realism unless fighting would be in vain (bandwagoning).

State as rational actor
Coercion theory (Thomas Shelling): states presented with choices, picks choice that maximizes its well-being. Give other states choices so the best choice is what we want: Defy/sticks vs. concede/carrots. Coercian is positive-sum (“positive sum”—not always equal wins in the win-win equation. If Melians’ had given up, they would have lost something, but been better off than how it would have been. The Athenians, too, would have lost less, though).

Terrorism: Threatening civilians for a political concession from leaders. Eg. US Sanctioning all of Iraq by any definition was terrorism. (Historically, terror (civilians targeted) was at the end of a war. No, with the nuclear age, terror can start it out. We act to coerce, not weaken militarily, but coercion often linked to civilian targets.?)

There is some distinction between coercion and terror.

Blainey: Similar theory in that states act rationally all the time. Rationally and optimally not same. Optimally requires perfect info. So why do we get wars? Miscalculation about power, or measures of power between countries uncertain. Most often when there is no war for a long time—war is out only measure of power. Both sides thing they can win.

Some alternatives to rational actors:
Fundamental attribution error. Jervis looking at psychology. Our “bad” decisions have justifications; others’ are evil. This is a form of misperception.
Bureaucratic politics
Individuals making decision have narrow interests
Standards operating procedures (SOPs)—thing in terms of what’s allowed, what’s already been done?

Saturday, September 15, 2007

Bonnie Bassler NPR story

(link to article)

Great article (I am a fan of most NPR stuff). The idea that one lone bacteria only sends out that beacon communication ("Hey! I'm over here") but as the colony grows, the amount of communicating grows--that really illustrates the idea of social capital, I think. As soon as that network of chemical language and back-and-forth ceases, it's just a group of bacteria as we've always envisioned them. But the idea of them working as a group really transforms their essence to most people, I would think.

Incidentally, I was led to this article, tangentially related to human interaction--a kind of surprising story, considering how alienated most people would consider typical urbanites. It's about a couple on an unofficial social study quest to see how many perfect strangers will let them try a bite of their food at a restaurant.

[hurray for networks! One led me to that second article]

Tuesday, September 11, 2007

Ecology and Community, Fritjof Capra

I thought this teaser was fantastic. It's such a deceptively simple metaphor, but even in this brief statement, Capra shows us how ecosystems/communities are simultaneously simple and infinitely complex.


The metaphor helped me resolve some confusion I took away from the Roseland article. He spoke briefly of the interconnectedness of communities, but Capra's article really drove home that while a community/ecosystem could be studied in isolation, a true isolate is rare--impossible if you go down to the microbial levels. With the world getting smaller as it is, humans are finally becoming aware of a global community. Naturally, it is made up of billions of smaller interconnected networks.

On the topic of the world "getting smaller"--specifically, due to population growth and technological advances that have really let us map the majority of the world--this article made me think about the distinction between the "linear" and the "cyclical" thinking that differentiates a sustainable community/ecosystem from, well, specifically, U.S. Americans. Really, when you consider it, a lion is not thinking cyclically when he attacks a gazelle and leaves the remainder of a carcass for scavengers and bacteria. However, that is the end result--the gazelle's remaining energy is recycled into the ecosystem.

Why have "modern" practices ceased to be sustainable? Is it because the Earth system can no longer process the types of things we have developed (plastics, processed petrochemicals)? I am put in mind of the Gaia Hypothesis I studied briefly in cultural geography--wherein the whole earth is the ultimate ecosystem. The sub-system of humanity is just one of the links in the network, and if it ceases to be a viable link, it will end, while the overall system will adjust (with that flexibility born of diversity that Capra mentions). One hopes that humans are smart enough to allay this particular path--but that requires awareness of their place in a system. That awareness would hopefully expand to include the many systems/networks/communities every person is a part of.

I think Megan has nailed where this disconnect lies--there is not really any talk in Capra's article about the flux we have so obviously been in, especially in the last century. We are in no way in equilibrium, which is likely why my thoughts strayed to the Gaia Hypothesis--as one vision of how ecological equilibrium could be restored.

Because of the ecology slant to this article, I am thinking along environmental sustainability lines. But I am aware the metaphor can go further.


I am definitely looking forward to reading Making Connections--it's waiting for me at the library.

Monday, September 10, 2007

Bringing theory and policy together. IR theory—basically, doing an action causes a predictable reaction. Explicit or implicit. Implicit’s problem means you can’t get the theory on the table to argue it, examine it.

Class of theories: realist, liberal, constructivists

Marxism fell out of favor (could have fallen into realist category).

Counterfactuals: all casual claims have implicit counterfactuals.

What makes a theory good/bad/better? How well does it explain reality? How often is it right or wrong? This is the most obvious. Here are ways to judge:
Goodness of fit.
Parsimony –all things equal, parsimony better; very few casual condition variables (eg. Realism)
Generalizability—relates to both dependent and independent variables.
Trade-offs between 1/3 and ½.
Also, how manipulable are the variables (can the theory be use to affect things. Eg, Policy variables better than structural variable. Process vs. structure.).

Levels of analysis: pertains to the independent variable.
Waltz’s three levels [Book: Man, the State, and War]. Dependent variables for all three is IR.
Man: Human nature (more deterministic) OR specific people (related to “Great man” theory of history)
State: internal workings; interest groups, government’s nature (E.g. No wars in democratic peace theory)
International/state system: states in an environment of anarchy. More important because it works in/allows for the other two levels to a lesser degree.
Some debate as to theories fitting into the above levels.

Melian Dialogues
The strong do what they can, the weak do what they must.
Norms of civility—for the weak, but should the strong also uphold?
Use of power important (precursor of realism)
Smart vs. honorable action
People fight losing wars hoping for allies
Importance of power distribution (international system) you would act the same in our position.
Naïve belief in help from others.
“Waterbirds”—overextended great power is vulnerable.
Final: Melians’ wishful thinking, misperception.

National Interest: Survival and power
Realism: power most important variable. Dynamics timeless.

Things to do as state vs. individual.
Machiavelli: Be willing to be “mean,’ but ideally be moderate to inferiors (Athenian idea). Ideally, feared AND loved. Choose fear if you have to because keeping order important. Your role as leader of states vs. as citizens different because consequences are greater as leader of state. Morality of a statesman different from morality in society (“end justifying the means” not so much personally).
Hobbes: main focus of Leviathan is domestic politics, very little on IR. Natural state of men is anarchy. T hen extrapolated to state level. The desires to dominate/be powerful, and to not be denominated. Getting a “rep” to get future things at lower cost. But what is glory? A real thing? The shadow of virtue. Honor/glory. Competition, diffidence (?), glory. First two get you stuff, and safety—rational wants. “Glory” gets you a reputation, and for credibility, it’s a rational drive. Glory/honor not material, seems in opposition/irrational. Doing things even if not in self-interest because of glory alone irrational.

Analytic—almost all theories have this component. How things are. (Hobbes here).
Normative—some theories have this. How things ought to be. Machiavelli here.

EH Carr: He himself not necessarily a realist, but has written great classic texts on realism. Differs from preceding realists: shows following the “right” thing can be disastrous. Eg League of Nations (problems from the concepts of collective security), as a recipe for perpetual peace. Carr’s concern with desire to fund/volunteer when it’s another state’s problem. This is why it’s on realist readings—wishful thinking becomes very dangerous to set up a system by.

Thursday, September 6, 2007

Book/article sources

Books and articles from the syllabus--resources for finding them. "Other" category for interesting looking things I came across in the searches. I have added the ISBN numbers, too. Links are directly to the listing (I'm not sure if the links will continue to work for the two library sites--not quite sure how those catalogues are set up). If I found them on Bookfinder, I made a note of it, but Bookfinder is hard to navigate, and I doubt I can get a direct link anyway. Try an ISBN search. Also, the Amazon used prices seemed generally to be the best result in Bookfinder.)

Books

Fritjof Capra (2004) The hidden connections: integrating the biological, cognitive, and social dimensions of life into a science of sustainability. ISBN: 0385494718

Jennifer A. Elliott (2006) An introduction to sustainable development. Routledge. ISBN 0415335590

*Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines (2002) Asset Building and community development. Sage Publications. ISBN 0761922636
  • Amazon (used $45)
  • UT Library
  • Megan has bought this one ("renting" them out--see link)
  • "Asset Building and Community development" search on Austin Craigslist
  • "Asset Building and Community development" search on ebay
  • Bookfinder

*John A. Hall and Frank Trentman (2005) Civil society: a reader in history, theory, and global politics. Palgrave-Macmillan. ISBN 1403915431

*Chris Maser (1996) Sustainable community development. Lucie Press.
  • The ISBN I'm searching is weird--it's turning up something different on a few sites, so I might have to come back to this one. Megan, where did you find yours??
  • Megan has bought this one ("renting" them out--see link)
  • UT Library
  • Can only find on Amazon for $250???
  • Some similar books by Maser on Bookfinder, but I'm not sure if they're identical
  • "maser" search on Austin Craigslist
  • "maser" search on ebay

*Paul Mattessich, et al (2004) Community building: what makes it work: a review of factors influencing successful community building. Amherst Wilder Foundation. ISBN 0940069121

Peet, R. and E. R. Hartwick (1999) Theories of Development. New York, Guilford Press. ISBN 1572304898

Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ISBN 0385720270

Articles (get to them through UT website--log-in to the off-campus Google scholar site here, and then the below should link to the articles on AcademicOneFile. If not, just search the titles and they should come up. Again, I'm not sure how the links will work on a web-based database...)
  1. Stephen M. Aigner, et al (2002) Whole community organizing for the 21st century Journal of the Community Development Society.
  2. Tom Borrup (2003) Toward asset-based community cultural development: a journey through the disparate worlds of community building. Center for Creative Communities.
  3. Neil Bradford (2005) Place-based public policy: towards a new urban and community agenda for canada. Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc.
  4. Jeffrey C. Bridger and A. E. Luloff (1999) Toward an interactional approach to sustainable Community development. Journal of Rural Studies, Vol. 15.
  5. Steven Brint (2001)Gemeinschaft revisited: a critique and reconstruction of the community concept Sociological Theory, Vol. 19, No. 1.
  6. Paul Florin and Abraham Wandersman (1990) An Introduction to Citizen Participation, Voluntary Organizations, and Community Development: Insights for Empowerment Through Research. American Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 1.
  7. Ronald J. Hustedde and Jacek Gan The basics: what's essential about theory for community development practice?. Vol. 33, No. 1.
  8. Mark Roseland (2000) Sustainable community development: integrating environmental, economic, and social objectives. Progress in Planning.
  9. Patricia Shields (1998) Pragmatism as a philosophy of science: a tool for public administration Research in Public Administration, Vol. 4.
  10. Patricia Shields (2003) A pragmatic teaching philosophy. Journal of Public Affairs Education.
  11. Patricia Shields (2003b) The community of Inquiry: classical pragmatism and public administration Administration and Society.
  12. Alison Mathie (2003) Who is driving development? reflections on the transformative potential of asset-based community development. Coady International Institute.
  13. ???? Robert H. McNulty (2005) Using an Asset-Based Community Development Approach Globally Beyond the Developed World. Asia-Pacific Creative Communities: A Strategy for the 21st Century.
  14. Kenneth P. Wilkinson (1970) The community as a social field. Social Forces, Vol. 48, No. .

Other (may grow as time goes on)

Mindwalk [videorecording] / the Atlas Production Company presents in association with Mindwalk Productions a Lintschinger/Cohen production ; a film by Bernt Capra ; screenplay by Floyd Byars & Fritjof Capra ; produced by Adrianna AJ Cohen ; directed by Bernt Capra
  • UT Library/FAC

Monday, September 3, 2007

Mark Roseland (2000) Sustainable community development: integrating environmental, economic, and social objectives. Progress in Planning.

Some of these are just ideas I found interesting. Any thoughts, reactions of my own are in blue.

"Social capital is created when individuals learn to trust each other so that they are able to make credible commitments and rely on generalized forms of reciprocity rather than narrow sequences of quid pro quo relationships." p 81

"Social capital differs from other forms of capital in several significant ways, one of which is that it is not limited by material scarcity, meaning that its creative capacity is limited only by imagination. It thereby also suggests a route toward sustainability, by replacing the fundamentally illogical model of unlimited growth within a finite world, with one of unlimited development which is not bound by the availability of material resources."
p82

Interesting--the differentiation between growth and development. Similarly:

"...we must also shift our economic development emphasis from the traditional concern with increasing growth to reducing social dependence on economic growth, or what we might call economic demand management." p95
"...work for which there is social demand but no market demand." p96

"The more populous the city and the richer its inhabitants, the larger its 'ecological footprint' is likely to be in terms of its demand on resources." p101-102

This is pretty intuitive--but it makes me wonder, is this in comparison to the same number of people living in a rural settings' combined ecological footprint? Clearly urban sprawl/North American land use patterns are largely at fault in making cities the inefficient global citizens that they are. But in some ways, can't we look at the advantages that the centralization lends itself to? Most online quizzes measuring your personal ecological footprint will tell you living in an apartment building is actually more sustainable than living in your own personal house (depending somewhat, of course, on the size of your family, square footage etc). Where are the other places (besides land use) that cause this logic to fall down in the face of large-scale pooling of resources (i.e. large towns or cities)?


"...everyone has a stake in implementing a decision, because all have participated in its formation (participants have more energy for working in groups with which they are fully in agreement)" P107

Just wanted to share my limited experience in consensus decision making. It has often been in very small communities/committees where "turnover" was high, and the above quoted advantage to the process was kind of lost--the next "generation" felt an arbitrary decision was handed down, and all the work done in arriving at the decision was often not appreciated.

"Sustainability communities will not, therefore, merely 'sustain' the quality of our lives--they will dramatically improve it." P127

Interesting, the multiple connotations of the word "sustain." I've had similar thoughts about the duality of the word "tolerance."

Saturday, September 1, 2007

rag and bone men

(Chapter 2, Roseland, Sustainable community development: integrating environmental, economic, and social objectives)

It strikes me as very counterintuitive that poverty is commonly held culpable for unsustainable environmental practices. Last year I traveled to Buenos Aires very briefly for work, and in addition to the tourist sites we passed, my coworkers pointed out a lot of symptoms of the economic meltdown their country experienced a few years before.

One example that struck me was a host of homeless men and women sifting through the garbage for recyclables. Of course, their existence must have been terrible, as I can't imagine the profit margin on trash is very high. But at the same time, it made me think for a long time after about how abject poverty gives meaningful value to everything a society produces. That is, when you have no reason to value an empty aluminum can (say, because you are a millionaire) there is no reason not to toss it out (unless you are morally persuaded to recycle it). However, if the few pennies you get for reclaiming it means you eat a full meal that day, you will of course sift through the discarded treasure of the strata of society economically above you. I do tend to (cynically? Economics is by definition cynical) believe that building in economic advantages to a action is more effective than simple moral suasian, but it doesn't sit well.

I think it was an entry in the Oxford English Dictionary for rag and bone men (linked to Wikipedia here, though not the exact definition I remember) that said the men traveled town to town collecting rags and burnt charcoal and bones from fires--basically trash, but they refashioned the refuse into useable items. I had conflicting thoughts about how great that was (nothing wasted), and how awful it was (to live under the constant the social stigma of scavenging).

List of class blogs

K a r l a
K e n

L i n d a
M a t t
T h o m a s