realism, continued

Morgenthau: how does he differ from previous realists? Formalizes the theory. Does he believe in reality that all states want to increase power? Some want to expand, some want to preserve. Imperialist and revolutionary power. But are there other types of states (theories not always emphasizing goodness of fit). “Reality is deficient in this respect.” So why is the theory so useful? Better to be prepared for the worst. Is there a down-side to using a theory this way? Misperception, misuse of resources. He never makes explicit these reasons and downsides.

Analytic and normative aspects of theory. Realism—analytic: “States maximize power.” Normative: “As a state, you should act this way to keep power balanced.” But the second statement in theory unnecessary if the first statement is true.

Balance of Power: Various meanings. Be specific what you mean when you use it.
Measurement: “correlation of forces.” (Sonets(??)); balance can favor ones(?)
Balance of Power as strategy/choice: think Bismarck. Smaller states joining to balance a larger power. Eg., in a system of five powers, you always need to be allied with three.
As a law of international politics. Something states do naturally (as opposed to the “strategy” definition). Eg. Waltz


Morgenthau: Definition of “power”: some elements:
Geography (eg UK is island, Switzerland has mountains). Difficulty to invade (thing Russia vs Belgium). However, not manipulable, must adapt, compensate.
Natural resources: not always correlated; need to concert to power; stronger power wanting to have close alliance, colonize; economic power=potential military power, autonomy. Ability to mobilize, build your own military. Ability to survive an embargo.
Population—from which military can arise, allowing people to continue industry back home. Also take into account rough technological equivalence. You can afford more losses. Iran’s “human waves.” (Iran’s only superiority was numbers).
National morale. Percent of citizen willing to fight (think Vietnam).

(Levels of analysis
people—Machiavelli, Morganthau
states—
International system—Waltz )

[Theories:
Bandwagoning
Balance of Power
“Birds of a Feather” (<-constructivist)
Balance of Threat (similar to collective security; not realist strategy/policy)]

Waltz: explicit differences between Waltz’s “Theory of International…” and other realists. Machiavelli, for example, says states act how they do because of human nature (humans want power, therefore states want power). Waltz however focuses on the anarchy of states; his theory rooted in the international system. Known as “structural realist” or “neorealist.”

Neorealist: breaks down into defense (Waltz) and offensive)

Waltz: Balance of Power as law. Inevitability, though state may put choice and intention behind it—ally with weaker states against stronger. (When would a state sally with larger power? If you have no choice, Melians should have bandwagoned, for instance). But does this happen in reality? In a real-life analogy, does it seem logical (wouldn’t you want to befriend the biggest kid on the block?). But Waltz’s smaller alliances preserve a state’s autonomy. Ideology (“birds of a feather”) doesn’t matter—smaller power causes alliances more than anything. Even if big states pacifist—intentions are transient (second level of analysis), but power in enduring.
States looking to survive, no maximize power. “States can seldom survive trying to maximize power as goal.” Because it creates enemies, puts your security at risk.

Walt: Waltz’s student. State doesn’t balance on basis of power—law is wrong. States will, instead, make alliances based on how much a state is a threat. (Also disagrees with “birds of a feather”). One state attacks another, its threat gets bigger, not necessarily its power. Alliances still against the “big” country. Four variables to assess:
1. Power
2. Offensive (military) power
3. Proximity
4. Aggressive intentions. Past performance a good indicator of future actions. So a powerful state may be an attractive ally if it is pacifist/not empirical.

Mearscheimer: Structuralist/neorealist; offensive realist. Different from Waltz because he advises: attack. Because otherwise they will one day be coming after you. Why doesn’t balancing behavior solve this, as Waltz says (when others will ally against you). Think League of Nations. Alliances will be abandoned before an actual attack. Underbalancing, “buck passing.”

Does it pay to be aggressive in the international system? Still debated.

Offense/defense balance: What condition determines whether offense or defense is “right?” How easy is it to conquer another state, all else equal? Answer depends, for example, on military technology, terrain. If all world were Switzerland, defensive balance would make sense. If all were Belgium, offensive would be the norm.

Soft Power (Nye): Part of realism. Difference between definition in academia (where it originated) and in political/media realm. Hard power—military. People do what you want because of threat (implied or explicit). Soft power—no threat. Attractiveness of main state. Can be from propaganda, active convincing.
Money—hard power generally. Economic power money lent with strings attached. Economic sanctions—coercive mechanisms (but if people voluntarily ask your help because of a strong economy, that’s soft power. But most people mean “economic power” as coercive economic power, therefore, technically, hard power). Using hard power to create soft power (eg. Aid during earthquakes, tsunami).
China more attractive because of noninterference. Soft power theory says that smaller countries will begin working with China, not US.
Diplomacyàleverageàcoercionàhard power (quid pro quo—carrot of stick=hard power).

China, Russia, India alliance against sanctions for Iran. What is basis of alliance? Economic interest?

Why do many countries ally with Russia currently? Inconsistent with realism unless fighting would be in vain (bandwagoning).

State as rational actor
Coercion theory (Thomas Shelling): states presented with choices, picks choice that maximizes its well-being. Give other states choices so the best choice is what we want: Defy/sticks vs. concede/carrots. Coercian is positive-sum (“positive sum”—not always equal wins in the win-win equation. If Melians’ had given up, they would have lost something, but been better off than how it would have been. The Athenians, too, would have lost less, though).

Terrorism: Threatening civilians for a political concession from leaders. Eg. US Sanctioning all of Iraq by any definition was terrorism. (Historically, terror (civilians targeted) was at the end of a war. No, with the nuclear age, terror can start it out. We act to coerce, not weaken militarily, but coercion often linked to civilian targets.?)

There is some distinction between coercion and terror.

Blainey: Similar theory in that states act rationally all the time. Rationally and optimally not same. Optimally requires perfect info. So why do we get wars? Miscalculation about power, or measures of power between countries uncertain. Most often when there is no war for a long time—war is out only measure of power. Both sides thing they can win.

Some alternatives to rational actors:
Fundamental attribution error. Jervis looking at psychology. Our “bad” decisions have justifications; others’ are evil. This is a form of misperception.
Bureaucratic politics
Individuals making decision have narrow interests
Standards operating procedures (SOPs)—thing in terms of what’s allowed, what’s already been done?