Types of misperception: (these are first level of analysis because based on human failings)
Fundamental attribution error (state acting rationally but you interpret as evil intent).
First state assumes other state acting rationally (could be, for example, bureaucratic politics, if they are not considered possible reasons for action).Eg: some psychological factors cause irrational actions (Jervis lists many):groupthink (sort of a type of misperception)Mirror-imaging—when you look at others, you assume they are like you (sort of opposite of fundamental attribution error). Both of these are biased on assumptions of intent not based in fact. Culture is a key concept here: what is it? Beliefs/values that are society-wide.
(more of Jervis:)instrumental goals become reified, even after significant changes. Like a treaty you assume is as important as ever. It’s human nature to hang onto ideas, even after utility outlived.Eg: anti-ballistic missile treaty. But then Cold War ended, so we might want a missile defense for rogue states. The fact that it was an instrument for an original, specific problem is forgotten.Eg NATO originally against Soviets
Having past experiences with traumatic events will color reactions. Eg: Hitler::Milosovic/Saddam/Akhmadinjad comparisons. We take the lesson to never appease anyone.
Tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized.
If the bad guy does something we like—it’s our influence, not that they turned good, or chance. But we learn lesson to repeat whatever we did, whether or not it was actually influential.
Not misperception, but worth thinking about: propaganda. Should not affect why the STATE goes to war—just why citizens back it.

Bureaucratic Politics
How do people in government decide what policies to favor (covered last class)
How does government enact the eventual choice?
Your interest narrower than national interest (Morgenthau) (your job, you agency’s survival).
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): For example, something made sense in the past, but may be no longer applicable).
How do interests get aggregated? Different groups [come?] up with difference courses of action. Meetings with individuals—lobbying, personal decisions. So it really depends on the government set up how the ideas are pulled together.
How do decisions get implemented?
§ Agencies may not comply—failure to succeed (if truly an impossible goal, not really bureaucratic politics.
§ Someone who didn’t like the policy in the first place could delay, sabotage till no longer applicable. Eg. People who disagreed with giving weapons to Afghanistan.
So there, rational decision processes that get waylaid.

Groupthink: Closely related to individual errors, but always occur group of individuals. First image theory, but different from simple misperception. Eg: Bay of Pigs. Somewhat personal psychology of wanting to belong to a group. But also, lack of access to power (Eg: Colin Powell’s eventual “support” of the war). Is this real reason, or just a justification? Since if you always kowtow, there is no real power to preserve.
Groups can make this additional mistake over the individual—by recognizing misperception but not saying anything. Not always the case.
Is groupthink ever good? Eg military, pro-ethnic diversity (racists rejected, silenced)
Patterns with bad groupthink. Difficulty with after the screw-up, admitting mistakes.

Other Jervis reading (spirals): *fundamentally important reading*
Point touches on one Morgenthau.
“One’s prescription is another’s proscription”
Deterrence—to threaten the other side
Appeasement—give them what they want, don’t provoke them.
Which do you do? Depends on what? Incorrect decision leads to loss of security, annihilation. Interesting problems are when outcomes include your own downfall. Jervis describes states generally threatening. Prescription: threaten and aggressor, appease a status-quo state. Can’t necessarily determine what kind of state it is by its specific demands. Threatening a status quo state leads to spiral of threat/aggression.

Status quo
Aggressive
Threaten
Transformed to revolutionary state=
WAR
Back down=
PEACE
Appease
PEACE
“give an inch, it takes a mile” = WAR
They can’t be a appeased, and now you’re fighting a stronger state.

What helps you determine its intentions? Military trends? No—actions of a state give you no way to know for sure. Intent commonly misperceived (as we saw today).

Sawyer—why is Osama a “hero” to some? Muslims feel attacked, they change their intent as a result of our action, our policies which are seen as attacking them. Examples of US attack on world of Islam: troops in Saudi Arabia (Arabian Peninsula where infidels should not be). East Timor vs. Indonesia—Osama viewed it as hurting an Islamic state for the sake of creating a Catholic state, even if the Indonesians did not feel that way. Even if US invited onto Arabian Peninsula, elsewhere we appear to be the aggressor. Blocking Islamic charitable donations. All of these are policies that may have valid goals, but they aren’t examined in terms of how outsiders would perceive them. Long list of reasons for why Muslim people would hate US for what we do not who we are.

Realism and Change
Up to now, our realism studies have been snapshot theories. Realism theory predicts the simple thing that will always remain true. But things sometimes will change somewhat. EG power changes, relative power changes.
Why does relative power of states change? War could cause it; economic conditions; shocks (eg drought) leads to economic change; technology.
How often do states expand when they have the ability? White says never. Is this offensive or defensive realism? Could be either. So power expansion doesn’t tell us if they’re revolutionary or status quo.
Has the drive for territorial colonialism gone away? Since realism doesn’t change, where has this drive gone? Economic control of territories, eg quid pro quo with Saudi Arabia. Financial markets controlled by US.
So form of the power dynamic has changed; people may have realized the cost of territorial colonialism.
Ottaway and Lacina: New forms of international interventions. Humanitarian, generally. Who benefited, who lost? Hard power to increase soft power. So truly humanitarian not intended to benefit the intervener. So, how’s Kosovo doing now? Now Albanians discriminate against the Serbs. Is that good?? We still have 17,000 troops in Kososvo. The constant is that the strong like to meddle in the affairs of the weak. Also, not much sign that it really works.

Hegemonic Stability
(reading: Kindleberger on the 1929 Depression)
Two definitions:
Hegemon: more power than all the other states combined (unipolarity)
Hegemon: state with more power than any individual state. This is the functional definition which is part of the hegemonic stability theory.

Hegemon can keep the peace (by being the “world’s policeman”). Any nations fight, and the hegemon has enough power to have its way despite the will of others.

Hegemonic stability also applies to economic stability (Kindleberger’s focus more on economics). Think subprime failure of this year—all aspects of world economy quickly affected. But why didn’t we get a sudden depression? The Fed can provide liquidity for the entire world. Because the US can provide enough resources to back up markets worldwide. If everyone in the world had equal power/money, no one country could bail out the whole world crisis by adding liquidity. This is the advantage of an economic hegemon. Public good can be provided, either as security, or lender of last resort. Otherwise, all states would have to coordinate interest rates etc. (Gilpin and Copeland).

Does the hegemon benefit less than the smaller powers?

Note: Image opposes previous images that small states would join together against the larger.